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Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization

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  • Lockwood, Ben

Abstract

This paper integrates the distributive politics literature with the literature on decentralization by incorporating inter-regional project externalities into a standard model of distributive policy. A key finding is that the degree of uniformity (or 'universalism') of the provision of regional projects is endogenous and depends on the strength of the externality. The efficiency of decentralization and the performance of 'constitutional rules' (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization are then discussed in this framework. Stronger externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not imply that decentralization becomes more efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Lockwood, Ben, 1998. "Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2046, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2046
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decentralization; distributive politics; Local Public Goods;

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures

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    1. Politik blok birokrasi in Wikipedia Indonesian ne '')

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