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It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations

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  • Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

Abstract

We investigate the possible explanations for variations in aggregate levels of participation in large-scale political demonstrations. A simple public choice inspired model is applied to data derived from the annual May Day demonstrations of the Danish labor movement and socialist parties taking place in Copenhagen in the period 1980–2011. The most important explanatory variables are variations in the weather conditions and consumer confidence, while political and socio-economic conditions exhibit no robust effects. As such accidental or non-political factors may be much more important for collective political action than usually acknowledged and possibly make changes in aggregate levels of political support seem erratic and unpredictable. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

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  • Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2013. "It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 251-271, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:3:p:251-271
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9914-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Jo Thori Lind, 2019. "Spurious weather effects," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 322-354, March.
    2. Berman, Nicolas & Couttenier, Mathieu & Monnet, Nathalie & Ticku, Rohit, 2022. "Shutdown policies and conflict worldwide," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 240-255.
    3. Vincent Munley & Abian Garcia-Rodriguez & Paul Redmond, 2023. "The impact of voter turnout on referendum outcomes: evidence from Ireland," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(3), pages 369-393, March.
    4. Lind, Jo Thori, 2020. "Rainy day politics. An instrumental variables approach to the effect of parties on political outcomes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    5. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2014. "Politik er (næsten) ligegyldigt for demonstrationer [Politics is (almost) irrelevant in demonstrations]," MPRA Paper 57195, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collective action; Demonstrations; Free-riding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P36 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training; Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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