The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities
The Condorcet jury-theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members may only commit one type of error. In binary decision situations however, two error types may occur, the probability of which is independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of the theorem.
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