IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v42y1984i3p257-272.html

Are qualified majority rules special?

Author

Listed:
  • Shmuel Nitzan
  • Jacob Paroush

Abstract

This essay provides a formal justification for qualified majority rules. Specifically, within an uncertain dichotomous choice framework, in which individual preferences are identical but actual judgments may differ, special majority rules emerge as decision rules that maximize the probability of making correct decisions. The main result specifies the optimal special majority as a function of a priori bias in favor of the status quo, ability, and size of the decision-making body. The analysis of the relationships among these three variables in generating certain common qualified majority rules is then pursued. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Suggested Citation

  • Shmuel Nitzan & Jacob Paroush, 1984. "Are qualified majority rules special?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 257-272, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:42:y:1984:i:3:p:257-272
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124945
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00124945
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00124945?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:63:y:1969:i:01:p:40-56_26 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Raphael Kazmann, 1973. "Democratic organization: A preliminary mathematical model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 17-26, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Christian List, 2002. "On the Significance of the Absolute Margin," Public Economics 0211004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Karotkin, Drora & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1995. "The effect of expansions and substitutions on group decision-making," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 263-271, December.
    3. Christian List, 2003. "What is special about the proportion? A research report on special majority voting and the classical Condorcet jury theorem," Public Economics 0304004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
    5. Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Khuller, Samir & Kraus, Sarit, 2001. "Optimal collective dichotomous choice under partial order constraints," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 349-364, May.
    6. Lloyd Shapley & Bernard Grofman, 1984. "Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 329-343, January.
    7. Peter Coughlin, 1989. "Economic policy advice and political preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 201-216, June.
    8. Eyal Baharad & Ruth Ben-Yashar, 2009. "The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 53-59, April.
    9. Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1998. "Quality and structure of organizational decision-making," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 521-534, September.
    10. Vitaly Malyshev, 2021. "Optimal majority threshold in a stochastic environment," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 427-446, April.
    11. Andras Pete & David L. Kleinman & Krishna R. Pattipati, 1993. "Tasks and Organizations: A Signal Detection Model of Organizational Decision Making," Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 2(4), pages 289-303, December.
    12. Roland Kirstein, "undated". "The Condorcet Jury-Theorem with Two Independent Error-Probabilities," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1154, Berkeley Electronic Press.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Roger Faith & James Buchanan, 1981. "Towards a theory of yes-no voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 231-245, January.
    2. Leiter, Debra & Murr, Andreas & Rascón Ramírez, Ericka & Stegmaier, Mary, 2018. "Social networks and citizen election forecasting: The more friends the better," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 235-248.
    3. Bryan C. McCannon & Paul Walker, 2016. "Endogenous competence and a limit to the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 1-18, October.
    4. Bryan C. McCannon, 2015. "Condorcet jury theorems," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 9, pages 140-160, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Murr, Andreas E., 2015. "The wisdom of crowds: Applying Condorcet’s jury theorem to forecasting US presidential elections," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 916-929.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:42:y:1984:i:3:p:257-272. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.