Voting on Multiple Issues: What to Put on the Ballot?
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- Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny & Shi, Xianwen, 0. "Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
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- repec:cup:apsrev:v:63:y:1969:i:01:p:40-56_26 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:6:p:1477-1506 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsMultidimensional Voting; Mechanism Design; Rotation; Strategy-Proof Mechanisms; Budgeting Procedure;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-09-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2018-09-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2018-09-10 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2018-09-10 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2018-09-10 (Positive Political Economics)
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