Is Diversity in Capabilities Desirable When Adding Decision Makers?
When the benefit of making a correct decision is sufficiently high, even a slight increase in the probability of making such a decision justifies an increase in the number of decision makers. Applying a standard uncertain dichotomous choice benchmark setting, this study focuses on the relative desirability of two alternatives: adding individuals with capabilities identical to the existing ones and adding identical individuals with mean-preserving capabilities that depend on the states of nature. Our main result establishes that when the group applies the simple majority rule, variability in the capabilities of the new decision makers under the two states of nature, which is commonly observed in various decision-making settings, is less desirable in terms of the probability of making the correct decision.
|Date of creation:||16 Mar 2016|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Faculty Building II, 2-1, Naka, Kunitachi, 186 - 8601|
Phone: (+81) 42 – 580 - 8604
Fax: (+81) 42 – 580 - 8605
Web page: http://hias.ad.hit-u.ac.jp/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ben-Yashar, Ruth C & Nitzan, Shmuel I, 1997. "The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(1), pages 175-186, February.
- Ladha, Krishna K., 1995. "Information pooling through majority-rule voting: Condorcet's jury theorem with correlated votes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 353-372, May.
- Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Danziger, Leif, 2011.
"Symmetric and asymmetric committees,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 440-447.
- Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Danziger, Leif, 2011. "Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees," IZA Discussion Papers 5782, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Leif Danziger, 2011. "Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees," CESifo Working Paper Series 3501, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Mor Zahavi, 2011. "The Condorcet jury theorem and extension of the franchise with rationally ignorant voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 435-443, September.
- Ruth Ben-Yashar & Igal Milchtaich, 2007. "First and second best voting rules in committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 453-486, October.
- Ruth Ben-Yashar, 2014. "The generalized homogeneity assumption and the Condorcet jury theorem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 237-241, August.
- Raaj Kumar Sah, 1991. "Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
- Sah, R.K., 1991. "Fallibility In Human Organizations And Political Systems," Papers 625, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1067-1095, April.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 43283, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00978004, HAL.
- Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. "Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 451-470, June.
- Daniel Berend & Jacob Paroush, 1998. "When is Condorcet's Jury Theorem valid?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(4), pages 481-488.
- Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1982. "Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 289-297, June.
- Eyal Baharad & Ruth Ben-Yashar, 2009. "The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 53-59, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.