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Variable Competence and Collective Performance: Unanimity vs. Simple Majority Rule

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  • BAHARAD, Eyal
  • BEN-YASHAR, Ruth
  • NITZAN, Shmuel

Abstract

Under the unanimity rule, a single voter may alter a decision that is unanimously accepted by all other voters. Under the simple majority rule, the impact of such a voter diminishes. This paper examines the marginal effect of competence on the collective performance – the likelihood of reaching a correct decision. It is shown that under the unanimity rule (simple majority rule), adding an incompetent voter to the group is inferior (superior) to giving up an existing competent voter. The negative impact of an incompetent voter cannot (can) always be balanced by adding a competent one when the decision mechanism is the unanimity (simple majority) rule. Moreover, improving a single voter's competence may have a greater effect on the collective performance under the simple majority rule relative to the unanimity rule.

Suggested Citation

  • BAHARAD, Eyal & BEN-YASHAR, Ruth & NITZAN, Shmuel, 2018. "Variable Competence and Collective Performance: Unanimity vs. Simple Majority Rule," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-80, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-80
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Ben-Yashar, Ruth & Danziger, Leif, 2016. "The unanimity rule and extremely asymmetric committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 107-112.
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    Keywords

    Unanimity rule; simple majority rule; voters' competence; collective performance;
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