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Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems

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  • Raaj Kumar Sah

Abstract

This paper presents a perspective on some organizational consequences of human fallibility. It may be easier to get a flavor of the relevant issues by examining the role of fallibility in specific settings, rather than through abstract arguments. So, in the next three sections, I consider several different settings: the question of diversification versus concentration of political authority, the managerial succession process in organizations, and the choice of ideas and projects (including innovation-oriented projects) in organizations. In the last section, I highlight some aspects of the approach underlying the analyses of human fallibility, in particular: the premises concerning an individual decisionmaker, the potential association between the motivation of an organization's employees and their fallibility, and the nature and the aims of the analysis of organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Raaj Kumar Sah, 1991. "Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:5:y:1991:i:2:p:67-88
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.5.2.67
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines

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