Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems
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Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.5.2.67
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- Sah, R.K., 1991. "Fallibility In Human Organizations And Political Systems," Papers 625, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
References listed on IDEAS
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JEL classification:
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
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