Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives?
Download full text from publisherTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
References listed on IDEAS
- J.K. Sebenius & P.J.E. Stan, 1982. "Risk-Spreading Properties of Common Tax and Contract Instruments," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 555-560, Autumn.
- Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, 1981. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 605-617, Autumn.
- Joskow, Paul L, 1985.
"Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants,"
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 33-80, Spring.
- Paul Joskow, 1984. "Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal Burning Electric Generating Plants," Working papers 361, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Cheung, Steven N S, 1969. "Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 23-42, April.
- Ronald I. McKinnon, 1967. "Futures Markets, Buffer Stocks, and Income Stability for Primary Producers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 844-844.
- Alan J. Marcus, 1982. "Risk Sharing and the Theory of the Firm," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 369-378, Autumn.
- Newbery, David M, 1989. "The Theory of Food Price Stabilisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(398), pages 1065-1082, December.
- H. Stuart Burness & W. David Montgomery & James P. Quirk, 1980. "The Turnkey Era in Nuclear Power," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 56(2), pages 188-202.
- Shavell, Steven, 1976. "Sharing Risks of Deferred Payment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(1), pages 161-168, February.
- Gershon Feder & Richard E. Just & Andrew Schmitz, 1980. "Futures Markets and the Theory of the Firm under Price Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 317-328.
- Holthausen, Duncan M, 1979. "Hedging and the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 989-995, December.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Imran Rasul & Daniel Rogger, 2013.
"Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service,"
STICERD - Public Economics Programme Discussion Papers
20, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Rasul, Imran & Rogger, Daniel, 2016. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service," CEPR Discussion Papers 11078, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rasul, Imran & Rogger, Daniel, 2013. "Management of bureaucrats and public service delivery: evidence from the Nigerian civil service," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58161, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "A theoretical framework for incentives in the public sector," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(2), pages 1-8.
- Harrison, Mark, 2011. "Secrecy, Fear and Transaction Costs: The Business of Soviet Forced Labour in the Early Cold War," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 47, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Makris, Miltiadis, 2009.
"Incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 428-440, August.
- Miltiadis Makris, 2006. "Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint," Discussion Papers 0601, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Miltiadis Makris, 2009. "Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint," Post-Print hal-00683158, HAL.
- Duvanova, Dinissa, 2014. "Economic Regulations, Red Tape, and Bureaucratic Corruption in Post-Communist Economies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 298-312.
- Paul, Samuel, 1991. "Accountability in public services : exit, voice and capture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 614, The World Bank.
- Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999. "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 17-58, July-dece.
- Cavalluzzo, Ken S. & Ittner, Christopher D., 2004. "Implementing performance measurement innovations: evidence from government," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 29(3-4), pages 243-267.
- Paul, Samuel, 1994. "Does voice matter? : for public accountability, yes," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1388, The World Bank.
- Christopher M Snyder & Robert P Trost & R. Derek Trunkey, 2001. "Bidding behavior in the department of defense's commercial activities competitions," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 21-42.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013.
"Contracts offered by bureaucrats,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 686-711, December.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques LawarrÃ©e, 2013. "Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 4511, CESifo Group Munich.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarree, 2013. "Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats," Working Papers UWEC-2013-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Raaj Kumar Sah, 1991.
"Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
- Sah, R.K., 1991. "Fallibility In Human Organizations And Political Systems," Papers 625, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
- Frank Flatters & W. Macleod, 1995. "Administrative corruption and taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(3), pages 397-417, October.
- François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.
- Avdasheva, Svetlana & Kryuchkova, Polina, 2015. "The ‘reactive’ model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions – The Russian case," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 200-208.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:1:p:131-61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jleo .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .