Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives?
Download full text from publisherTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Laurent Franckx & Isabelle Brose, 2004. "A theoretical framework for incentives in the public sector," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(2), pages 1-8.
- Mark Harrison, 2013.
"Secrecy, Fear and Transaction Costs: The Business of Soviet Forced Labour in the Early Cold War,"
Europe-Asia Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 65(6), pages 1112-1135.
- Harrison, Mark, 2011. "Secrecy, Fear and Transaction Costs: The Business of Soviet Forced Labour in the Early Cold War," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 47, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Makris, Miltiadis, 2009.
"Incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 428-440, August.
- Miltiadis Makris, 2006. "Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint," Discussion Papers 0601, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Miltiadis Makris, 2009. "Incentives for Motivated Agents under an Administrative Constraint," Post-Print hal-00683158, HAL.
- Paul, Samuel, 1991. "Accountability in public services : exit, voice and capture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 614, The World Bank.
- Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999. "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 17-58, July-dece.
- Cavalluzzo, Ken S. & Ittner, Christopher D., 2004. "Implementing performance measurement innovations: evidence from government," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 29(3-4), pages 243-267.
- Paul, Samuel, 1994. "Does voice matter? : for public accountability, yes," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1388, The World Bank.
- Powell-Jackson, Timothy & Purohit, Bhaskar & Saxena, Deepak & Golechha, Mahaveer & Fabbri, Camilla & Ganguly, Partha Sarthi & Hanson, Kara, 2019. "Measuring management practices in India's district public health bureaucracy," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 292-300.
- Christopher M Snyder & Robert P Trost & R. Derek Trunkey, 2001. "Bidding behavior in the department of defense's commercial activities competitions," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 21-42.
- Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013. "Contracts offered by bureaucrats," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 686-711, December.
- Raaj Kumar Sah, 1991.
"Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
- Sah, R.K., 1991. "Fallibility In Human Organizations And Political Systems," Papers 625, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Avdasheva, Svetlana & Kryuchkova, Polina, 2015. "The ‘reactive’ model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions – The Russian case," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 200-208.
- Imran Rasul & Daniel Rogger, 2018.
"Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(608), pages 413-446, February.
- Imran Rasul & Daniel Rogger, 2013. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service," STICERD - Public Economics Programme Discussion Papers 20, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Rasul, Imran & Rogger, Daniel, 2016. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service," CEPR Discussion Papers 11078, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rasul, Imran & Rogger, Daniel, 2013. "Management of bureaucrats and public service delivery: evidence from the Nigerian civil service," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58161, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Duvanova, Dinissa, 2014. "Economic Regulations, Red Tape, and Bureaucratic Corruption in Post-Communist Economies," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 298-312.
- P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
- Frank Flatters & W. Macleod, 1995. "Administrative corruption and taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(3), pages 397-417, October.
- François Cochard & Julie Le Gallo & Laurent Franckx, 2015. "Regulation Of Pollution In The Laboratory: Random Inspections, Ambient Inspections, And Commitment Problems," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(S1), pages 40-73, December.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:1:p:131-61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jleo .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/jleo .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.