IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica

  • Kenneth Mackenzie

    ()

    (University of Calgary)

This survey article provides a microeconomic perspective of institutional design and public policy, focusing on the way the relations between voters, politicians and bureaucrats produce efficients outcomes in public policy. It points out the relevance of information and monitoring costs, competition and the structural features of institutions in the search of efficient results, and the way social scientists explain the failures of the political and burocratic markets.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/kmackenzie1.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

Volume (Year): 1 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (July-december)
Pages: 17-58

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:1:y:1999:i:1:p:17-58
Contact details of provider: Postal: Cra. 1 No. 12-68 Casa de las Mandolinas
Phone: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1307
Fax: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1304
Web page: http://www.economiainstitucional.com
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Santerre, Rexford E, 1993. " Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Public Bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 189-98, July.
  2. Thomas McGuire, 1981. "Budget-maximizing governmental agencies: An empirical test," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 313-322, January.
  3. Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December.
  4. De Groot, Hans & Van der Sluis, Johan, 1987. "Bureaucracy Response to Budget Cuts: An Economic Model," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 103-09.
  5. Kau, James B & Keenan, Donald & Rubin, Paul H, 1982. "A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 271-93, May.
  6. Becker, Gary S, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation: Comment," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 245-48, August.
  7. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-43, December.
  8. Breton, Albert & Wintrobe, Ronald, 1992. "Freedom of speech vs. efficient regulation in markets for ideas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 217-239, March.
  9. Fiorina, Morris P. & Noll, Roger G., . "Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institutional Design in the Public Sector," Working Papers 194, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. David Laband, 1983. "Federal budget cuts: Bureaucrats trim the meat, not the fat," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 311-314, January.
  11. von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995. "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 771-779, April.
  12. Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1977. "Voting in a Local School Election: A Micro Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 59(1), pages 30-42, February.
  13. Blais, Andre & Nadeau, Richard, 1992. " The Electoral Budget Cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 389-403, December.
  14. Wittman, Donald, 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1395-1424, December.
  15. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 563-87, November.
  16. Peltzman, Sam, 1990. "How Efficient Is the Voting Market?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 27-63, April.
  17. Filimon, Radu & Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1982. "Asymmetric information and agenda control : The bases of monopoly power in public spending," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 51-70, February.
  18. Ashenfelter, Orley C & Kelley, Stanley, Jr, 1975. "Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 695-733, December.
  19. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
  20. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-27, August.
  21. Hahn, Robert W, 1990. " The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation: Towards a Unifying Framework," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 21-47, April.
  22. Dougan, William R & Snyder, James M, 1993. " Are Rents Fully Dissipated?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 793-813, December.
  23. Crowley, R.W., 1994. "The Public Sector and Public Provision in Economic Theory," Papers 94-08, Queen's at Kingston - School of Policy Studies.
  24. Eliakim Katz & Jacob Rosenberg, 1989. "Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation: Preliminary results for 20 countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 133-144, February.
  25. Bruno Frey & Werner Pommerehne, 1982. "How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 253-262, January.
  26. Carroll, Kathleen A, 1993. " The Effects of Multiple Objectives in the Theory of Public Sector Supply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 1-20, January.
  27. Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 1995. "Decision Externalities, Economic Efficiency and Institutional Response," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 21(3), pages 344-361, September.
  28. James M. Buchanan, 1949. "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57, pages 496.
  29. Comanor, William S., 1976. "The median voter rule and the theory of political choice," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1-2), pages 169-177.
  30. Hettich, W. & Winer, S.L., 1993. "Institutional Mechanisms for Efficient Policy," Papers 93-10, Queen's at Kingston - School of Policy Studies.
  31. de Groot, Hans, 1988. "Decentralization decisions in bureaucracies as a principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 323-337, August.
  32. Trebilcock, Michael J. & Hartle, Douglas G., 1982. "The choice of governing instrument," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, June.
  33. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 328.
  34. James M. Buchanan, 1988. "MarketFailure and Political Failure," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 8(1), pages 1-13, Spring/Su.
  35. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  36. Peter Coughlin, 1982. "Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 427-433, January.
  37. Wittman, Donald, 1977. "Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 180-189, February.
  38. Weingast, Barry R & Moran, Mark J, 1983. "Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(5), pages 765-800, October.
  39. Kitchen, H., 1993. "Efficient Delivery of Local Government Services," Papers 93-15, Queen's at Kingston - School of Policy Studies.
  40. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1986. "Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 131-61, Spring.
  41. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1982. "Median Voters or Budget Maximizers: Evidence from School Expenditure Referenda," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(4), pages 556-78, October.
  42. Peltzman, Sam, 1984. "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(1), pages 181-210, April.
  43. K. Palda & Kristian Palda, 1985. "Ceilings on campaign spending: Hypothesis and partial test with Canadian data," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 313-331, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:1:y:1999:i:1:p:17-58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paola Rodríguez)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.