IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v60y1989i2p133-144.html

Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation: Preliminary results for 20 countries

Author

Listed:
  • Eliakim Katz
  • Jacob Rosenberg

Abstract

In this paper we present quantitative measures of the ‘proneness’ of different countries to respond to pressure groups in determining the composition of their spending. These, in turn, help us to derive simple measures of the rent-seeking done in relation to the government's spending pie. Despite the fact that these measures are indicative rather than conclusive they do provide some means of comparing the extent of this rent-seeking waste (or at least its rank distribution) across countries. Also, with the appropriate provios the measures may be used as first approximations for the actual waste generated by rent-seeking activities for government spending. Such measures may be of considerable importance when the question of the optimality of government intervention in a given country is considered. Alternatively, it may be of use when an aid package to a given country from an international agency or a major economy is being considered. At least the rank of a given economy in Tables 1 and 2 can profitably be taken as an additional decision parameter in such cases. But over and above the specific results and methodology used herein we consider the contribution of this paper to be in hopefully stirring interest in the important but much neglected issue of macroeconomic rent-seeking. We feel that this paper has shown that the problem of estimating rent-seeking at the macro level can be attempted. Of course, we expect that our approach will eventually be superseded by further work in the area. Nonetheless, this paper will have achieved its main aim if it stimulates further developments in this hereto barren field. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Suggested Citation

  • Eliakim Katz & Jacob Rosenberg, 1989. "Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation: Preliminary results for 20 countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 133-144, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:60:y:1989:i:2:p:133-144
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00149241
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00149241
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF00149241?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eliakim Katz & J. Smith, 1988. "Rent-seeking and optimal regulation in replenishable resource industries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 25-36, October.
    2. Richard A. Posner, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 45-65, Springer.
    3. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    4. Mahmudul Anam & Eliakim Katz, 1988. "Rent-seeking and second best economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 215-224, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Czyżewski, Bazyli, 2016. "Political Rents of European Farmers in the Sustainable Development Paradigm. International, national and regional perspective," MPRA Paper 74253, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Min Jeong Park, 2007. "Rent Seeking in Korean Government Budget Allocation," International Review of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 33-44, January.
    3. Daniel Levy & Avichai Snir, 2022. "Potterian economics," Oxford Open Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 1, pages 1-32.
    4. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2014. "Rent seeking and the excess burden of taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 158-167.
    5. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
    6. Jankowska, Barbara, 2001. "Wpływ grup interesów na konkurencyjność w świetle koncepcji rent-seeking," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2001(1-2), January.
    7. Shmuel Nitzan, 2008. "Collective Rent Dissipation," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 309-321, Springer.
    8. Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2005. "(Why) are economists different?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 543-562, September.
    9. Gael Lagadec, 2014. "Are political support-driven policies always bad? The case of large interest groups," European Journal of Government and Economics, Europa Grande, vol. 3(2), pages 138-147, December.
    10. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2008. "Direct democracy: obstacle to reform?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 81-93, June.
    11. Hessami, Zohal, 2014. "Political corruption, public procurement, and budget composition: Theory and evidence from OECD countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 372-389.
    12. Levin, Mark (Левин, Марк) & Shilova, Nadezhda V. (Шилова, Надежда), 2016. "Rentseeking Behavior in Systems with a Complex Structure [Рентоориентированное Поведение В Системах Со Сложной Структурой]," Working Papers 2272, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    13. Tariq Hussain & Khizra Rana, 2022. "Rent Seeking Policy, Institutions and Corruption in Specific Countries of the World," Journal of Policy Research (JPR), Research Foundation for Humanity (RFH), vol. 8(4), pages 283-291, December.
    14. Kahana, Nava & Klunover, Doron, 2014. "Rent Seeking and the Excess Burden of Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 8160, IZA Network @ LISER.
    15. Karl W ärneryd, 2003. "Information in conflicts," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 487-502, Springer.
    16. repec:elg:eechap:15325_13 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999. "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 17-58, July-dece.
    18. Bedasso, Biniam, 2012. "Lords of Uhuru: the political economy of elite competition and institutional change in post-independence Kenya," MERIT Working Papers 2012-042, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    19. repec:elg:eechap:15325_2 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robert D. Cairns, 1992. "La recherche de rentes en situation d’incertitude avec ou sans opposition," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 68(3), pages 477-498.
    2. Tan Ngoc Vu & Duc Hong Vo & Michael McAleer, 2019. "Rent seeking for export licenses: Application to the Vietnam rice market," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2019-13, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
    3. Kjell Hausken, 2023. "Two-period Colonel Blotto contest with cumulative investments over variable assets with resource constraints," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(11), pages 1-18, November.
    4. Antoine Gentier & Giusepina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2011. "Rent dissipation or government predation ? The notes issuance activity in Italy 1865-1882," Post-Print hal-00735325, HAL.
    5. James Lake & Maia Linask, 2015. "Costly distribution and the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 211-238, December.
    6. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
    7. Robert Tollison, 2012. "The economic theory of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 73-82, July.
    8. Vitor Melo & Stephen Miller, 2022. "Estimating the Effect of Rent-Seeking on income distribution: an analysis of U.S. States and Counties," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 99-114, July.
    9. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Institutional dynamics under revenue volatility and revenue-dependent lobbying power: A stochastic differential game approach," DEM Discussion Paper Series 15-08, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    10. Hanley Nick & MacKenzie Ian A, 2010. "The Effects of Rent Seeking over Tradable Pollution Permits," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, July.
    11. Nikos Alabanos & Sotiris Theodoropoulos, 2016. "A key-point comparison & the new challenges for the existent Administrative Burden Models (A.B.M’s)," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 66(1-2), pages 32-45, January-J.
    12. Hwan Baik, Kyung & Lee, Sanghack, 1997. "Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 121-130, February.
    13. Amihai Glazer, 2008. "Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities," Working Papers 080908, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    14. John P. Formby & Paul D. Thistle & James P. Keeler, 1990. "Costs under Regulation and Deregulation: The Case of US Passenger Airlines," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 66(4), pages 308-321, December.
    15. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    16. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 391-397, Springer.
    17. Raouf Boucekkine & Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2015. "Symmetric vs Asymmetric Equilibria and Stochastic Stability in a Dynamic Game of Legislative Lobbying," AMSE Working Papers 1531, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jan 2018.
    18. Maria Arbatskaya & Hugo Mialon, 2010. "Multi-activity contests," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 23-43, April.
    19. Jay S. Coggins, 1995. "Rent Dissipation And The Social Cost Of Price Policy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 147-166, July.
    20. Karim Khan, 2015. "Endogenous Institutional Change and Privileged Groups," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 54(3), pages 171-195.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:60:y:1989:i:2:p:133-144. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.