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Classroom Games: Rent-Seeking and the Inefficiency of Non-market Allocations

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  • Jacob K. Goeree
  • Charles A. Holt

Abstract

Economics is often taught at a level of abstraction that can hinder some students from gaining basic intuition. However, lecture and textbook presentations can be complemented with classroom exercises in which students make decisions and interact. The approach can increase interest in and decrease skepticism about economic theory. This feature offers short descriptions of classroom exercises for a variety of economics courses, with something of an emphasis on the more popular undergraduate courses.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Classroom Games: Rent-Seeking and the Inefficiency of Non-market Allocations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 217-226, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:13:y:1999:i:3:p:217-226
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.13.3.217
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.13.3.217
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
    2. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    3. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    4. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1998. "Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 828-853, August.
    5. Millner, Edward L & Pratt, Michael D, 1991. "Risk Aversion and Rent-Seeking: An Extension and Some Experimental Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 81-92, February.
    6. Arye Hillman & Dov Samet, 1987. "Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 63-82, January.
    7. Edward Millner & Michael Pratt, 1989. "An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 139-151, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Grace Finley & Charles Holt & Emily Snow, 2019. "The welfare costs of price controls and rent seeking in a class experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(3), pages 753-771, September.
    2. Michelle S. Goeree & Jeroen Hinloopen, 2008. "Cooperation in the Classroom: Experimenting with R&D Cooperatives," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(4), pages 357-373, September.
    3. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Zheng, Liping & Severe, Sean, 2016. "Teaching the macroeconomic effects of tax cuts with a quasi-experiment," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 55-65.
    5. Garrouste, Christelle & Loi, Massimo, 2009. "Applications De La Theorie Des Jeux A L'Education: Pour Quels Types Et Niveaux D'Education, Quels Modeles, Quels Resultats? [Applications of Game Theory in Education - What Types and At What Levels," MPRA Paper 31825, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Joshua Hall & Josh Matti & Amir B. Ferreira Neto, 2019. "Rent-seeking in the classroom and textbooks: Where are we after 50 years?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 71-82, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A20 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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