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Cooperation in the Classroom: Experimenting with R&D Cooperatives

Author

Listed:
  • Michelle Sovinsky Goeree

    (Claremont McKenna College)

  • Jeroen Hinloopen

    (Universiteit van Amsterdam)

Abstract

This discussion paper resulted in the article Journal of Economic Education (2008), 39(4), 357-373. This paper describes a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student sellers first make investment decisions then production decisions. The classroom game can be used to motivate discussions of research joint ventures, the free-rider problem, collusion, and antitrust policy regarding research and development.

Suggested Citation

  • Michelle Sovinsky Goeree & Jeroen Hinloopen, 2006. "Cooperation in the Classroom: Experimenting with R&D Cooperatives," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-081/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060081
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Don J. Webber & Andrew Mearman, 2012. "Students’ perceptions of economics: identifying demand for further study," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(9), pages 1121-1132, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    classroom games; research and development; research joint ventures; technological spillovers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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