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Heterogeneity in R&D Cooperation Strategies

Listed author(s):
  • Belderbos, Rene
  • Carree, Martin A
  • Diederen, Bert
  • Lokshin, Boris
  • Veugelers, Reinhilde

We explore heterogeneities in the determinants of innovating firms’ decisions to engage in R&D cooperation, differentiating between three types of cooperation partners: suppliers and customers (vertical cooperation), competitors (horizontal cooperation), and universities and research laboratories (institutional cooperation). We use panel data on innovating firms drawn from two Dutch Community Innovation Surveys in 1996 and 1998. Applying a system method estimator for probit equations shows significantly positive correlations between the different cooperation decisions, suggesting that R&D cooperation strategies are complements rather than substitutes. We find that the determinants of R&D cooperation differ significantly and substantially across cooperation types. As suggested by industrial organization theory of R&D cooperation, the effects of spillovers depend on their source: while horizontal spillovers have ambiguous effects on horizontal cooperation, vertical spillover positively impact vertical cooperation and institutional spillovers significantly impact all types of cooperation. The results are largely robust to correction for potential simultaneity bias.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4021.

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Date of creation: Aug 2003
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4021
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  1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
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  8. Fritsch, Michael & Lukas, Rolf, 2001. "Who cooperates on R&D?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 297-312, February.
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  10. Gamal Atallah, 2002. "Vertical R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 179-209.
  11. Takeo Nakao, 1982. "Product Quality and Market Structure," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 133-142, Spring.
  12. Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1307-1320, December.
  13. William Greene, 2004. "Convenient estimators for the panel probit model: Further results," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 21-47, January.
  14. Klevorick, Alvin K. & Levin, Richard C. & Nelson, Richard R. & Winter, Sidney G., 1995. "On the sources and significance of interindustry differences in technological opportunities," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 185-205, March.
  15. Pavitt, Keith, 1984. "Sectoral patterns of technical change: Towards a taxonomy and a theory," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(6), pages 343-373, December.
  16. Peters, Bettina & Lööf, Hans & Janz, Norbert, 2003. "Firm Level Innovation and Productivity: Is there a Common Story Across Countries?," ZEW Discussion Papers 03-26, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  17. Bronwyn H. Hall & Albert N. Link & John T. Scott, 2003. "Universities as Research Partners," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(2), pages 485-491, May.
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