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Decentralization decisions in bureaucracies as a principal-agent problem


  • de Groot, Hans


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  • de Groot, Hans, 1988. "Decentralization decisions in bureaucracies as a principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 323-337, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:36:y:1988:i:3:p:323-337

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. John Whalley, 1984. "Trade Liberalization among Major World Trading Areas," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262231204, July.
    2. St-Hilaire, France & Whalley, John, 1983. "A Microconsistent Equilibrium Data Set for Canada for Use in Tax Policy Analysis," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 29(2), pages 175-204, June.
    3. Wayne R. Thirsk & Robert R. Wright, 1977. "The Impact of the Crude Oil Subsidy on Economic Efficiency in Canada," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 3(3), pages 355-364, Summer.
    4. Shoven, John B & Whalley, John, 1984. "Applied General-Equilibrium Models of Taxation and International Trade: An Introduction and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 22(3), pages 1007-1051, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. William D. Savedoff, 1997. "Social Services Viewed Through New Lenses: Agency Problems in Education and Health in Latin America," Research Department Publications 3017, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999. "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 17-58, July-dece.
    3. Hikaru Ogawa, 2001. "Allocation of authority under central grants," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 159-172, July.
    4. Lundin, Martin & Skedinger, Per, 2006. "Decentralisation of active labour market policy: The case of Swedish local employment service committees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 775-798, May.
    5. Ping Zhang & Eivind Tandberg & Ehtisham Ahmad, 2002. "On National or Supranational Objectives; Improving the Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs," IMF Working Papers 02/209, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2013. "Incentives and Influence Activities in the Public Sector: the Trade-off in Performance Budgeting and Conditional Grants," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201320, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    7. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2012. "Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201212, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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