IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/bjposi/v18y1988i03p353-395_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Formal Models of Bureaucracy

Author

Listed:
  • Bendor, Jonathan

Abstract

Formal analysis is fairly new in public administration, and there is some scepticism in the field about the intellectual advantages of mathematical methods. This is appropriate. Using these methods is now faddish, and fads can cause goal displacement. A formal model of bureaucracy should be only a tool for deepening our knowledge about public organizations. If the underlying ideas are silly, translating them into mathematics will do little good. If they are promising, however, deductive reasoning can help us explore their potential: if one believes A is a general property of bureaucracies, to fail to work out A's logical implications would be throwing away information. Analysis can also increase the falsifiability of our ideas: if A implies B but empirically we find not-B, the truth status of A is brought into question. Or it may turn out, as Arrow discovered about democratic principles, that our informal ideas are logically inconsistent: we thought properties C and D describe existing or possible institutions, but recasting the ideas into mathematical form reveals that such an institution is impossible. Finally, some problems are just too hard to tackle without formal tools. It is unlikely, for example, that Robert Axelrod would have discovered the robustness of the simple strategy of tit-for-tat in the two person prisoners' dilemma without the help of a computer (to pit tit-for-tat against many opponents in thousands of rounds of play) and of mathematics (to prove some generic properties of tit-for-tat).

Suggested Citation

  • Bendor, Jonathan, 1988. "Formal Models of Bureaucracy," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 353-395, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:18:y:1988:i:03:p:353-395_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0007123400005160/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kwan Nok Chan & Shiwei Fan, 2021. "Friction and bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 1406-1418, October.
    2. John Brehm & Scott Gates, 1994. "When Supervision Fails to Induce Compliance," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 323-343, July.
    3. Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999. "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 17-58, July-dece.
    4. Carlsen, Fredrik, 1996. "A note on budget schemes in the public sector," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 149-156, April.
    5. Anusha Nath, 2018. "Bureaucrats and Politicians: Electoral Competition and Dynamic Incentives," 2018 Meeting Papers 896, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic theory and the welfare state : a survey and interpretation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 279, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Bale, Malcolm & Dale, Tony, 1998. "Public Sector Reform in New Zealand and Its Relevance to Developing Countries," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 13(1), pages 103-121, February.
    8. Maria Alessandra Antonelli, 2009. "Citizens' Information and the Size of Bureaucracy," Annals of the University of Petrosani, Economics, University of Petrosani, Romania, vol. 9(1), pages 17-26.
    9. Anthony M. Bertelli & Sven E. Feldmann, 2006. "Structural Reform Litigation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 159-183, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:18:y:1988:i:03:p:353-395_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/jps .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.