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Structural Reform Litigation

Author

Listed:
  • Anthony M. Bertelli

    (Department of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia, bertelli@uga.edu)

  • Sven E. Feldmann

    (Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Centre for Economic and Business Research, Copenhagen)

Abstract

Initiated by interest groups representing the interest of a class of agency clients, structural reform litigation shapes the administration of important policy domains, particularly in the social services. Employing a spatial bargaining model we show that, instead of holding the agency to its mandate, structural reform litigation constitutes an institutional tool that creates bureaucratic drift even if courts are policy neutral. Since courts permit negotiation between agency and interest group plaintiff in designing remedies, it is very difficult for a legislature to enforce statutory constraints via judicial oversight and to stem this form of policy drift.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony M. Bertelli & Sven E. Feldmann, 2006. "Structural Reform Litigation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(2), pages 159-183, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:18:y:2006:i:2:p:159-183
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629806061859
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yehuda ELIYA & Nicolae BIBU, 2019. "The Relation between Accountability and the Climate of Service in Israeli Public organisations," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 20(1), pages 30-51, March.
    2. Peter Grajzl, 2011. "A property rights approach to legislative delegation," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 177-200, June.

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