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Unions and the Economic Performanceof Brazilian Establishments

  • Naercio Menezes-Filho
  • Helio Zylberstajn
  • Jose Paulo Chahad
  • Elaine Pazello

Using a pooled sample, this paper indicates that unions seem to affect the economic performance of Brazilian establishments, especially in terms of profitability, employment and productivity. Unions tend to reduce profitability, whereas the relationship between union density and productivity, employment and average wages seems to be concave. These performance indicators first rise with union density up to a certain density level (usually about 50 percent) and then start to decline. These results indicate that some unionism may be good for the plants` economic performance, although too much unionism may start having negative effects.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 3157.

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Date of creation: Sep 2002
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3157
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  1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  2. R Blundell & Steven Bond, . "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data model," Economics Papers W14&104., Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  3. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
  4. S. Black & L. Lynch, 1997. "How to compete: the impact of workplace practices and information technology on productivity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20298, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  6. Dobson, Paul W., 1994. "Multifirm unions and the incentive to adopt pattern bargaining in oligopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 87-100, January.
  7. Gaston, Noel & Trefler, Daniel, 1995. "Union wage sensitivity to trade and protection: Theory and evidence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 1-25, August.
  8. Fallick, Bruce C & Hassett, Kevin A, 1999. "Investment and Union Certification," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(3), pages 570-82, July.
  9. Gregg, Paul & Machin, Stephen & Metcalf, David, 1993. "Signals and Cycles? Productivity Growth and Changes in Union Status in British Companies, 1984-9," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(419), pages 894-907, July.
  10. Menezes-Filho, Naercio Aquino, 1997. "Unions and Profitability over the 1980s: Some Evidence on Union-Firm Bargaining in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 651-70, May.
  11. Driffill, John & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1995. " Trade Liberalization with Imperfect Competition in Goods and Labour Markets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(2), pages 223-43, June.
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