Are Rents Fully Dissipated?
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Robert Tollison, 2012. "The economic theory of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 73-82, July.
- R. Kenneth Godwin & Edward J. López & Barry J. Seldon, 2006. "Incorporating Policymaker Costs and Political Competition into Rent‐Seeking Games," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 73(1), pages 37-54, July.
- Adarkwah Yaw Antwi & John Adams, 2003. "Rent-seeking Behaviour and its Economic Costs in Urban Land Transactions in Accra, Ghana," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 40(10), pages 2083-2098, September.
- Davis, Douglas D & Reilly, Robert J, 1998.
"Do Too Many Cooks Always Spoil the Stew? An Experimental Analysis of Rent-Seeking and the Role of a Strategic Buyer,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1-2), pages 89-115, April.
- Douglas Davis & Robert Reilly, 1998. "Do too many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent-seeking and the role of a strategic buyer," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 89-115, April.
- Kenneth Mackenzie, 1999. "Diseño institucional y política pública: una perspectiva microeconómica," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 1(1), pages 17-58, July-dece.
- Becker, Gary S & Mulligan, Casey B, 2003.
"Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 293-340, October.
- Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," NBER Working Papers 6789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Becker, Gary S. & Mulligan, Casey B., 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," Working Papers 144, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2004.
"Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 51-74, Winter.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Ricard Gil, 2003. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?," NBER Working Papers 10040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joseph Michael Newhard, 2016. "An Interest Group Theory of Public Goods Provision: Reassessing the Relative Efficiency of the Market and the State," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Winter 20), pages 21-41.
- Min Jeong Park, 2007. "Rent Seeking in Korean Government Budget Allocation," International Review of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 33-44, January.
- Mulligan, Casey B. & Tsui, Kevin K., 2015.
"Political entry, public policies, and the economy,"
Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 377-397.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Kevin K. Tsui, 2008. "Political Entry, Public Policies, and the Economy," NBER Working Papers 13830, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mulligan Casey B & Gil Ricard & Sala-i-Martin Xavier X, 2010.
"Social Security and Democracy,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-46, March.
- Casey B. Mulligan & Ricard Gil & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2002. "Social Security and Democracy," NBER Working Papers 8958, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2002. "Social security and democracy," Economics Working Papers 621, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Dougan, William R. & Snyder, James Jr., 1996.
"Interest-group politics under majority rule,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 49-71, July.
- Dougan, William R. & Snyder, James, 1990. "Interest-Group Politics under Majority Rule," Working Papers 62, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
- Randall G. Holcombe, 2017. "Political incentives for rent creation," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 62-78, March.
- Sanjib Bhuyan, 2000. "Corporate Political Activities and Oligopoly Welfare Loss," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 17(4), pages 411-426, December.
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