Fallibility In Human Organizations And Political Systems
This paper presents a perspective on some organizational consequences of human fallibility. It may be easier to get a flavor of the relevant issues by examining the role of fallibility in specific settings, rather than through abstract arguments. So, in the next three sections, I consider several different settings: the question of diversification versus concentration of political authority, the managerial succession process in organizations, and the choice of ideas and projects (including innovation-oriented projects) in organizations. In the last section, I highlight some aspects of the approach underlying the analyses of human fallibility, in particular: the premises concerning an individual decisionmaker, the potential association between the motivation of an organization's employees and their fallibility, and the nature and the aims of the analysis of organizations.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1991|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: U.S.A.; YALE UNIVERSITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER, YALE STATION NEW-HAVEN CONNECTICUT 06520 U.S.A|
Phone: (203) 432-3610
Fax: (203) 432-3898
Web page: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Holmstrom, Bengt, 1989. "Agency costs and innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 305-327, December.
- Baker, George P & Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1988.
" Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 593-616, July.
- Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory," Papers 88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Clive Bull & Janusz A. Ordover, 1987. "Market Structure and Optimal Management Organizations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(4), pages 480-491, Winter.
- Klevorick, Alvin K. & Rothschild, Michael & Winship, Christopher, 1984. "Information processing and jury decisionmaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 245-278, April.
- Alvin K. Klevorick & Michael Rothschild & Christopher Winship, 1982. "Information Processing and Jury Decisionmaking," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 635, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Joesph E. Stiglitz, 1975. "Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 552-579, Autumn.
- Koh, Winston T. H., 1992. "Human fallibility and sequential decision making : Hierarchy versus polyarchy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 317-345, August.
- Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-715, September.
- Sherwin Rosen, 1985. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," NBER Working Papers 1668, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bull, Clive & Ordover, Janusz A., 1987. "Market Structure and Optimal Management Organizations," Working Papers 87-28, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- James G. March, 1978. "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 587-608, Autumn.
- Holmström, Bengt, 1989. "Agency Costs and Innovation," Working Paper Series 214, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-654, May-June.
- Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1986. "Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 131-161, Spring. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:yalegr:625. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.