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Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice

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  • Roger Congleton

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  • Roger Congleton, 2007. "Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 499-501, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:133:y:2007:i:3:p:499-501
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-007-9216-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg (ed.), 2006. "Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033496, December.
    2. Peter Bernholz, 1986. "A general constitutional possibility theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 249-265, January.
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