Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance
No abstract is available for this item.
Volume (Year): 149 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wildasin, David E., 1988.
"Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
- WILDASIN, David, "undated". "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP 804, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Wildasin, D.E., 1987. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers 1987020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, 1990. "The Allocation of Resources by Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(3), pages 745-771.
- Sass, Tim R, 1992. "Constitutional Choice in Representative Democracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 405-424, December.
- Roger Congleton, 2001. "On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 193-215, September.
- Frey, Bruno S. & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "FOCJ: Competitive governments for Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 315-327, September.
- Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
- Lars-Erik Borge & Torberg Falch & Per Tovmo, 2008. "Public sector efficiency: the roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 475-495, September.
- Lars-Erik Borge & Torberg Falch & Per Tovmo, 2007. "Public Sector Efficiency: The Roles of Political and Budgetary Institutions, Fiscal Capacity and Democratic Participation," Working Paper Series 8407, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
- Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
- Grossman, Philip J. & Mavros, Panayiotis & Wassmer, Robert W., 1999. "Public Sector Technical Inefficiency in Large U.S. Cities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 278-299, September.
- Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg (ed.), 2006. "Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033496, December.
- Henderson, J Vernon, 1985. "The Tiebout Model: Bring Back the Entrepreneurs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(2), pages 248-264, April. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)