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The Allocation of Resources by Voting

Author

Listed:
  • Yoram Barzel
  • Tim R. Sass

Abstract

A general theory of voting, which explains under what conditions voting will be chosen as a means for allocating resources and how the constitution that governs the voting will be structured is presented. It is hypothesized that developers of voting organizations will structure their organizations in order to maximize the value of shares sold by minimizing the expected costs of wealth transfer and decision making in the voting organization. Implications regarding the allocation of votes and assessments within the organization, the domain of voting decisions, and the optimal voting rule are tested with data on the constitutional structure of condominium homeowner associations.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, 1990. "The Allocation of Resources by Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(3), pages 745-771.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:105:y:1990:i:3:p:745-771.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2023. "Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 27-44, January.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1998. "Cooperatives vs. outside ownership," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19360, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Barzel, Yoram, 1997. "Parliament as a wealth-maximizing institution: The right to the residual and the right to vote," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 455-474, December.
    4. Steven C. Hackett, 1992. "Heterogeneity and the Provision of Governance for Common-Pool Resources," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(3), pages 325-342, July.
    5. Feng Deng, 2017. "Homeowners association vs. leasehold," Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 307-327, October.
    6. Deng, Feng, 2003. "Comparative urban institutions and intertemporal externality: a revisit of the Coase conjecture," MPRA Paper 2223, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Feb 2007.
    7. Harry W. Richardson & Peter Gordon, 2000. "Compactness or Sprawl: America's Future vs. the Present," Working Paper 8645, USC Lusk Center for Real Estate.
    8. Alvin Lowi & Spencer MacCallum, 2014. "Community technology: liberating community development," Chapters, in: David Emanuel Andersson & Stefano Moroni (ed.), Cities and Private Planning, chapter 6, pages 106-134, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Economou, Emmanouel/Marios/Lazaros & Kyriazis, Nicholas & Metaxas, Theodore, 2015. "The Themistocles Naval Decree of 483/2 BCE and the Greek Referendum of 2015: A comparative analysis of choice set under direct democracy procedures," MPRA Paper 76421, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Cheung, K.S. & Wong, S.K. & Wu, H. & Yiu, C.Y., 2021. "The land governance cost on co-ownership: A study of the cross-lease in New Zealand," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    11. Roger Congleton, 2011. "Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 187-207, October.
    12. Feng Deng, 2018. "A theoretical framework of the governance institutions of low-income housing in China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 55(9), pages 1967-1982, July.
    13. Emmanouil M. L. Economou & Nicholas C. Kyriazis & Theodore Metaxas, 2017. "Ancient Athenians, Californians and Modern Greeks: A Comparative Analysis of Choice Set Under Direct Democracy Procedures," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 47-65, April.
    14. Bontems, Philippe & Fulton, Murray, 2009. "Organizational structure, redistribution and the endogeneity of cost: Cooperatives, investor-owned firms and the cost of procurement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 322-343, October.
    15. Peter Leeson, 2009. "The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 443-459, June.
    16. Candela, Rosolino A. & Piano, Ennio E., 2020. "The Art and Science of Economic Explanation: Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Yoram Barzel," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 119-126, April.
    17. Danny Ben-Shahar & Eyal Sulganik, 2005. "Can Co-Owners Agree to Disagree? A Theoretical Examination of Voting Rules in Co-Ownerships," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 207-223, September.
    18. Fukuju Yamazaki & Taisuke Sadayuki, 2017. "The Collective Action Problem in Japanese Condominium Reconstruction," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 20(4), pages 493-523.
    19. F. Frederic Deng, 2003. "Collective Goods and the Political Hold-Up Problem," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(2), pages 414-434, June.
    20. William H. Rogers, 2006. "A Market for Institutions: Assessing the Impact of Restrictive Covenants on Housing," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(4), pages 500-512.

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