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Die (Un-)Ordnung des deutschen Föderalismus: Überlegungen zu einer konstitutionenökonomischen Analyse

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  • Voßwinkel, Jan

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  • Voßwinkel, Jan, 2007. "Die (Un-)Ordnung des deutschen Föderalismus: Überlegungen zu einer konstitutionenökonomischen Analyse," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 07/1, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:aluord:071
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    6. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 22, pages 384-414, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg (ed.), 2006. "Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033496, April.
    8. Charles Blankart, 2000. "The Process of Government Centralization: A Constitutional View," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 27-39, March.
    9. Barry R. Weingast, 2005. "The Performance and Stability of Federalism: An Institutional Perspective," Springer Books, in: Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, chapter 7, pages 149-172, Springer.
    10. repec:bla:kyklos:v:34:y:1981:i:3:p:377-87 is not listed on IDEAS
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    12. Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
    13. Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Explaining Constitutional Change," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1847.
    14. Friedman, David, 1980. "Many, Few, One: Social Harmony and the Shrunken Choice Set," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(1), pages 225-232, March.
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