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Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law

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  • Roger D. Congleton

Abstract

SUMMARY In many settings, economic efficiency in law enforcement appears to require differential enforcement of the law. For example, as shown in the paper, crime prone populations warrant stronger sanctions than less crime prone populations if costly sanctions are to be meted out in an efficient manner. However, narrow economic analysis of efficient sanctions attributes an efficiency to modern democratic governments which can not be easily justified by analysis or experience. This paper demonstrates that constraining majority coalitions to write laws consistent with the principle of equal protection generally yields more desirable outcomes than obtained when majority coalitions are permitted to discriminate in an arbitrary manner. The efficiency case for equality before the law is based on political considerations rather than economic ones per se. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Das Kriterium der ökonomischen Effizienz bei der Durchsetzung von Recht scheint in vielen Situationen eine differenzierende Durchsetzung des Rechts zu erfordern. Wie in diesem Artikel ge‐zeigt werden kann, können beispielsweise für mehr zu Verbrechen neigende Bevölkerungsteile härtere Strafen gerechtfertigt sein, als für weniger zu Verbrechen neigende Bevölkerungsteile, wenn die mit hohen Kosten verbundene Bestrafung von Verbrechen effizient eingesetzt werden soil. Allerdings schreibt die ökonomische Analyse von effzienten Strafen modernen demokratischen Regierungen eine Effizienz zu, die durch Analyse oder Erfahrung nur schwer zu bestätigen ist. Dieses Papier zeigt nämlich, dass wünschenswertere Ergebnisse zu erzielen sind, wenn man Mehrheitskoalitionen dazu zwingt, Gesetze zu schreiben, die mit dem Prinzip der Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz übereinstimmen, als wenn man Mehrheitskoalitionen erlaubt, auf willkürliche Weise zu diskriminieren. Im Ergebnis lasst sich daher feststellen, dass die Effizienzargumente im Hinblick auf die Gleichheit bzw. Ungleicheit vor dem Gesetz lediglich auf politischen Überlegungen beruhen, aber nicht auf ökonomischen. RÉSUMÉ Dans beaucoup de situations, l'éfficience économique de l'application de la loi semble exiger une application différenciée. Par exemple, comme il est expliqué dans l'article, des lois plus restrictives peuvent ětre appliqués pour une partie de la population étant plus incliné a la criminalité que pour des parties moins inclinées, si les coǔts élevés de l'application de la loi doivent ětre utilisés avec éfficience. Pourtant, l'analyse économique sur la punition éfficiente attribue aux gouvernements démocratiques modernes une éfficience qui ne peut pas ětre justifyé aisément par l'analyse et l'expérience. Cet article montre que des résultats meilleures peuvent ětre atteints si des coalitions majoritaires peuvent ětre contraintes à concevoir des lois qui sont consistents avec le principe de la protection égale devant la loi, que si une coalition majoritaire permet de discriminer une partie de la population de manière arbitraire. L'éfficience du principe de l'égalité devant la loi est basé sur des considérations politiques, et non sur des considérations économiques.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger D. Congleton, 1997. "Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 485-505, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:50:y:1997:i:4:p:485-505
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-6435.00027
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    Cited by:

    1. Heshmati Almas & Karlson Nils & Box Marcus, 2013. "Generality, State Neutrality and Unemployment in the OECD," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 13(3-4), pages 333-358, December.
    2. Roger Congleton, 2014. "The contractarian constitutional political economy of James Buchanan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 39-67, March.
    3. Niclas Berggren, 1999. "A Preference-Utilitarian Foundation for the Generality Principle," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 339-353, November.
    4. Bruno Frey, 2013. "European unification: a new proposal," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 285-294, December.
    5. Niclas Berggren, 2000. "Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 353-369, December.

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