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Generality, State Neutrality and Unemployment in the OECD

  • Karlson, Nils

    ()

    (Ratio)

  • Box, Marcus

    ()

    (Ratio)

  • Heshmati, Almas

    ()

    (Ratio)

According to Buchanan and Congleton (1998), the generality principle in politics blocks special interests. Consequently, the generality principle should thereby promote economic efficiency. This study tests this hypothesis on wage formation and labor markets, by investigating whether generality defined as state neutrality could explain employment performance among OECD countries during 1970-2003. We identify three types of non-neutrality as concerns unemployment: the level or degree of government interference in the wage bargaining process over and above legislation which facilitate mutually beneficial wage agreements, the constrained bargaining range (meaning the extent to which the state favors or blocks certain outcomes of the bargaining process), and the cost shifting (which relates to state interference shifting the direct or indirect burden of costs facing the parties on the labor market). Our overall hypothesis is that nonneutrality or non-generality increases unemployment rates. The empirical results from the general conditional model suggest that government intervention and a constrained bargaining range clearly increase unemployment, while a few of the cost shifting variables have unexpected effects. The findings thus give some, but not unqualified, support for the generality principle as a method to promote economic efficiency.

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Paper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number 124.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 16 Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0124
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  1. Salvanes, Kjell G, 1997. " Market Rigidities and Labour Market Flexibility: An International Comparison," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(2), pages 315-33, June.
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  12. Blanchard, Olivier & Wolfers, Justin, 2000. "The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(462), pages C1-33, March.
  13. Robert Buchele & Jens Christiansen, 1999. "Employment and Productivity Growth in Europe and North America: The Impact of Labor Market Institutions," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(3), pages 313-332.
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  16. James Buchanan, 1993. "How can constitutions be designed so that politicians who seek to serve “public interest” can survive and prosper?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 1-6, December.
  17. Congleton, Roger D, 1997. "Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 485-505.
  18. Robert J. Flanagan, 1999. "Macroeconomic Performance and Collective Bargaining: An International Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1150-1175, September.
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