IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/cesptp/halshs-00624288.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-Enforcing Range of Contracts. The Case of French Livestock Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Armelle Mazé

    () (SADAPT - Sciences pour l'Action et le Développement : Activités, Produits, Territoires - AgroParisTech - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Claude Ménard

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Contract enforcement is acknowledged as a major issue in Law and in Economics. Contrasting substitution and complementary perspectives with respect to the role of private versus public enforcement institutions, this article analyses how contract law can support private institutions, and enhance economic efficiency. With multilateral agreements at stake, self-regulation and reputation mechanisms at the core of private ordering have limitations that collective organizations backed by the Law help to overcome. The analysis is substantiated by empirical data from the cattle industry. Our results suggest the need for a broader approach to contract regulation by legal scholars and antitrust-authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2010. "Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-Enforcing Range of Contracts. The Case of French Livestock Industry," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00624288, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00624288 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00624288
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00624288/document
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wang, Ruqu, 1995. "Bargaining versus posted-price selling," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1747-1764, December.
    2. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    3. Alston, Lee J. & Libecap, Gary D. & Mueller, Bernardo, 1999. "A model of rural conflict: violence and land reform policy in Brazil," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(02), pages 135-160, May.
    4. Greif, Avner, 1989. "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 857-882, December.
    5. Allen, Douglas W & Lueck, Dean, 1998. "The Nature of the Farm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 343-386, October.
    6. James A. Chalfant & Richard J. Sexton, 2002. "Marketing Orders, Grading Errors, and Price Discrimination," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(1), pages 53-66.
    7. Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 34(3), pages 444-463, July.
    8. Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135, March.
    9. Scott W. Fausti & Dillon M. Feuz, 1995. "Production Uncertainty and Factor Price Disparity in the Slaughter Cattle Market: Theory and Evidence," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 77(3), pages 533-540.
    10. Jill E. Hobbs, 1997. "Measuring the Importance of Transaction Costs in Cattle Marketing," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(4), pages 1083-1095.
    11. Libecap, Gary D, 1992. "The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat Inspection and Antitrust," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 242-262, April.
    12. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    13. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12331 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Barzel, Yoram, 1982. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 27-48, April.
    15. Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
    16. Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, "undated". "Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1011, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
    17. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2003. "Transaction Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 193-207, April.
    18. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, "undated". "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
    19. Greif, Avner & Milgrom, Paul & Weingast, Barry R, 1994. "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 745-776, August.
    20. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
    21. Bernstein, Lisa, 1992. "Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 115-157, January.
    22. McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999. "Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 637-658, October.
    23. Clay, Karen, 1997. "Trade without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 202-231, April.
    24. Sergio G. Lazzarini, 2004. "Order with Some Law: Complementarity versus Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 261-298, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yannis Bakos & Chrysanthos Dellarocas, 2011. "Cooperation Without Enforcement? A Comparative Analysis of Litigation and Online Reputation as Quality Assurance Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(11), pages 1944-1962, November.
    2. Jean-Baptiste Traversac & Hervé Lanotte, 2011. "An economic history of the Champagne contracts, lessons for regional development," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1145, European Regional Science Association.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00624288. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.