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Information distortion and competitive remedies in government transfer programs: The case of ethanol

Author

Listed:
  • Ronald N. Johnson
  • Gary D. Libecap

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the analogy between competitive markets and the political process that is central to much of the literature on the efficiency of government transfers. The key problem is that property rights in politics are much less well defined than they are in competitive markets. As the paper outlines, obtaining accurate information about the benefits and costs of transfers is likely to be much more difficult than envisioned in the literature. Investigators, as well as general voters, often must rely on the government and competing parties for provision of information about underlying program parameters and functional relationships. We argue that politicians and the affected interest groups have incentives to limit and distort the information that is released to voters and that political competition is unlikely to be an effective counter. In developing the argument, a theoretical framework is provided and applied in a case study of the ethanol transfer. The documented efforts to disguise the actual costs and benefits of the program are important for gaining a broader understanding of the functioning and costs of government transfers in the economy. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2001. "Information distortion and competitive remedies in government transfer programs: The case of ethanol," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 101-134, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:2:y:2001:i:2:p:101-134
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marc T. Law & Joseph M. Tonon & Gary J. Miller, 2008. "Earmarked: The Political Economy of Agricultural Research Appropriations," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 30(2), pages 194-213.
    2. Gary D. Libecap, 2018. "Douglass C. North: Transaction Costs, Property Rights, and Economic Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 24585, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Colin A. Carter & Gordon C. Rausser & Aaron Smith, 2017. "Commodity Storage and the Market Effects of Biofuel Policies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1027-1055.
    4. Tembo, Gelson & Epplin, Francis M. & Huhnke, Raymond L., 2003. "Integrative Investment Appraisal of a Lignocellulosic Biomass-to-Ethanol Industry," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 28(3), pages 1-23, December.
    5. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, 2003. "Transaction Costs and Coalition Stability under Majority Rule," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(2), pages 193-207, April.
    6. Gabriel E Lade & C-Y Cynthia Lin Lawell & Aaron Smith, 2018. "Designing Climate Policy: Lessons from the Renewable Fuel Standard and the Blend Wall," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 100(2), pages 585-599.
    7. Gary Libecap, 2007. "Regulation and Deregulation: Property Rights Allocation Issues in De Regulation of Common Pool Resources," ICER Working Papers 28-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    8. Gordon C. Rausser & Harry de Gorter, 2013. "US Policy Contributions to Agricultural Commodity Price Fluctuations, 2006-12," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2013-033, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    9. de Gorter, Harry & Rausser, Gordon C., 2013. "US Policy Contributions to Agricultural Commodity Price Fluctuations, 2006-12," WIDER Working Paper Series 033, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. Gary D. Libecap, 2018. "Policy Note: "Water Markets as Adaptation to Climate Change in the Western United States"," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(03), pages 1-13, July.
    11. Fox, Glenn & Shwedel, Kenneth, 2007. "North American Ethanol Bionenergy Policies and Their NAFTA Implications," 2007 NAAMIC Workshop IV: Contemporary Drivers of Integration 163897, North American Agrifood Market Integration Consortium (NAAMIC).
    12. Pinstrup-Andersen, Per (ed.), 2016. "Food Price Policy in an Era of Market Instability: A Political Economy Analysis," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198788836.
    13. Edwards, Eric C. & Cristi, Oscar & Edwards, Gonzalo & Libecap, Gary D., 2018. "An illiquid market in the desert: estimating the cost of water trade restrictions in northern Chile," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(6), pages 615-634, December.
    14. Keefer, Philip, 2001. "When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2543, The World Bank.
    15. Gary D. Libecap, 2016. "Coasean Bargaining to Address Environmental Externalities," NBER Working Papers 21903, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Key words: efficiency; government; information; ethanol; transfers; JEL classification: H3; L14;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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