Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective
Burden of proof rules, which require a specified party to produce evidence on a contested issue, are central to the adversary system. In this article, we model burden of proof rules as a device for minimizing the costs of litigation. The central point to emerge from the model is that, properly assigned, a burden of proof rule economizes on the transmission of information to the court. We use the model to explain characteristic practices of courts in assigning the burden of proof. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.
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