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Antidumping Policy In The European Community: Political Discretion Or Technical Determination

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  • Angelika Eymann
  • Ludger Schuknecht

Abstract

This paper demonstrates the prominent role of antidumping laws as an instrument of endogenous trade policy in the EC. In contrast with the U.S. where anti-dumping decisions are largely subject to technical determination and trade barriers result from protectionist rules, the EC application of antidumping laws provides protection through administrative discretion and political influence on administrators. Whereas political influence seems to have increased over time in the U.S., the results of our empirical analysis of the EC antidumping decisions in the 1980 to 1990 period indicate that it has been curbed by the increased formalization of the antidumping investigation in the EC in this period. The estimation results show, however, that the tightening impact of each of the three institutional changes during this period faded within two years. Copyright 1996 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..

Suggested Citation

  • Angelika Eymann & Ludger Schuknecht, 1996. "Antidumping Policy In The European Community: Political Discretion Or Technical Determination," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 111-131, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:8:y:1996:i:2:p:111-131
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 449-466, July.
    2. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1989. "Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion," NBER Working Papers 3016, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hillman, Arye L, 1990. "Protectionist Policies as the Regulation of International Industry," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 101-110, November.
    4. Finger, J. Michael & Murray, Tracy, 1990. "Policing unfair imports : the U.S. example," Policy Research Working Paper Series 401, The World Bank.
    5. Finger, J M & Hall, H Keith & Nelson, Douglas R, 1982. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 452-466, June.
    6. Finger, J Michael & Nogues, Julio, 1987. "International Control of Subsidies and Countervailing Duties," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 1(4), pages 707-725, September.
    7. repec:fth:michin:273 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Patrick Messerlin, 1989. "The ec antidumping regulations: A first economic appraisal, 1980–85," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 125(3), pages 563-587, September.
    9. Messerlin, Patrick A., 1990. "Antidumping regulations or procartel law? : the European Community chemical cases," Policy Research Working Paper Series 397, The World Bank.
    10. Michael P. Leidy & Bernard M. Hoekman, 1991. "Spurious Injury As Indirect Rent Seeking: Free Trade Under The Prospect Of Protection," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 111-137, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bown, Chad P., 2006. "The World Trade Organization and antidumping in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4014, The World Bank.
    2. Kokko, Ari & Gustavsson Tingvall, Patrik & Videnord, Josefin, 2017. "Which Antidumping Cases Reach the WTO?," Ratio Working Papers 286, The Ratio Institute.
    3. Bruce Blonigen & Thomas Prusa, 2003. "The Cost of Antidumping: the Devil is in the Details," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(4), pages 233-245.
    4. Kara M. Reynolds, 2009. "From Agreement to Application: An Analysis of Determinations under the WTO Antidumping Agreement," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 969-985, November.
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2007:i:18:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Mustapha SADNI JALLAB, 2007. "The Political Influence Of European And American Antidumping Decisions: Some Empirical Evidence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(18), pages 1-8.
    7. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
    8. Niels, Gunnar & ten Kate, Adriaan, 2006. "Antidumping policy in developing countries: Safety valve or obstacle to free trade?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 618-638, September.

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