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An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisions in Antidumoing, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases

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  • Robert E. Baldwin
  • Jeffrey W. Steagall

Abstract

This paper attempts to determine the economic factors that best explain the decisions of the International Trade Commission in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases, utilizing the economic data collected by the Commission for each investigation. We also consider the extent to which these factors measure the injury conditions and causation relationships specified in U.S. trade laws. Our analyses yield mixed results. For example, while the Commission tends to require declining profits and employment in an industry before recommending import protection in safeguard cases -- as specified in the law, it is not clear that it delineates between serious injury caused by increased imports and serious injury due to other factors. Similarly, in countervailing duty and antidumping cases, economic conditions, such as changes in industry shipments and the degree of capacity utilization, are taken into consideration in material injury decisions, but other factors one would expect to be associated with affirmative decisions, e.g., the ratio of unfair imports to consumption, do not seem to playa significant role. Some variables also enter significantly in the regressions that do not seem to be indicators of material injury.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert E. Baldwin & Jeffrey W. Steagall, 1993. "An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisions in Antidumoing, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases," NBER Working Papers 4282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4282
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J.M. Finger & H. Keith Hall & Douglas R. Nelson, 2002. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," Chapters, in: Institutions and Trade Policy, chapter 8, pages 81-95, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Hansen, Wendy L., 1990. "The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 21-46, March.
    3. Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 449-466, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    2. Ralf Boscheck, 2000. "Trade, competition and antidumping—Breaking the impasse!?," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 35(6), pages 282-287, November.
    3. Joseph F. Francois & Gunnar Niels, 2004. "Political Influence in a New Antidumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-011/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Meredith A. Crowley, 2004. "Antidumping Policy Under Imperfect Competition: Theory and Evidence," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 443, Econometric Society.
    5. Donald Feaver & Kenneth Wilson, 1999. "Unravelling causation: An empirical analysis of contingent protection in Australia," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 135(4), pages 692-708, December.
    6. Meredith A. Crowley, 2001. "Antidumping policy under imperfect competition," Working Paper Series WP-01-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    7. Benjamin Liebman, 2004. "ITC voting behavior on sunset reviews," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 140(3), pages 446-475, September.
    8. P. Tharakan & David Greenaway & Joe Tharakan, 1998. "Cumulation and injury determination of the European community in antidumping cases," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 134(2), pages 320-339, June.
    9. Nandana Baruah, 2007. "An Analysis of Factors Influencing the Anti‐dumping Behaviour in India," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(7), pages 1170-1191, July.
    10. Gunnar Niels & Adriaan Ten Kate, 2004. "Anti‐dumping Protection in a Liberalising Country: Mexico's Anti‐dumping Policy and Practice," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(7), pages 967-983, July.
    11. Michael M. Knetter & Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings: evidence from four countries," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 8, pages 153-169, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Yi Liu & Ning Zhang, 2015. "Sustainability of Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Evidence from Mexico’s Trade Liberalization toward China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 7(9), pages 1-20, August.
    13. Barrell, Ray & Pain, Nigel, 1999. "Trade restraints and Japanese direct investment flows," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 29-45, January.
    14. John Mutti, 1993. "Intellectual Property Protection in the United States under Section 337," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 339-357, May.
    15. Donald Feaver & Kenneth Wilson, 2004. "The 'Market' for contingent protection," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(4), pages 497-509.
    16. René Belderbos, 1997. "Antidumping and tariff Jumping: Japanese firms’ DFI in the European union and the United States," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 133(3), pages 419-457, September.

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