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Une analyse empirique des décisions en matière d’antidumping aux États-Unis

Author

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  • Gasmi, Farid

    (Institut d’Économie Industrielle, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, France)

  • Hansen, Wendy L.

    (Department of Political Science, University of New Mexico, États-Unis)

  • Laffont, Jean Jacques

    (Institut d’Économie Industrielle, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, France)

Abstract

U.S. firms seek regulation against foreign firms that are alleged to have dumped their goods in the U.S. market, preying on domestic firms. Regulators, empowered by the legislative body, administer antidumping laws to counter such practices. However, due to informational asymmetries that exist between the legislative body and domestic firms, and because of the discretionary power of the regulatory body, which is supposed to bridge this information gap, regulators may be captured. We examine the possibility of regulatory capture in the context of the administration of the U.S. Antidumping law. Les firmes américaines, qui deviennent la proie des firmes étrangères faisant du dumping sur le marché américain, réclament que ces dernières soient soumises à une réglementation. Jouissant des pleins pouvoirs qui leur sont conférés par le corps législatif, les législateurs mettent en application des lois antidumping pour contrer de telles pratiques. Toutefois, la présence d’asymétrie dans l’information entre le corps législatif et les firmes domestiques, à laquelle s’ajoute le pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’organisme de réglementation qui est sensé réduire cette asymétrie, pourraient rendre captifs les membres de cet organisme. Nous examinons la possibilité d’une réglementation captive dans le contexte de l’application des lois antidumping américaines.

Suggested Citation

  • Gasmi, Farid & Hansen, Wendy L. & Laffont, Jean Jacques, 1997. "Une analyse empirique des décisions en matière d’antidumping aux États-Unis," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(1), pages 423-456, mars-juin.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:73:y:1997:i:1:p:423-456
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
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    3. Moore, Michael O, 1992. "Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(3), pages 449-466, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. François Tandé, 2006. "Taxes antidumping et règle des faits disponibles," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 1053-1063.

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