Rules or Politics? An Empirical Analysis of ITC Anti-dumping Decisions
This research analyzes the International Trade Commission's antidumping decisions from 1980 to 1986. The results suggest that commissioners use criteria consistent with the instructions set forth in U.S. legislation. The analysis also indicates that political variables help predict commissioner decisions. Petitions involving Senate Oversight Committee members' constituencies may be systematically favored in the process. Evidence of possible bias toward less-developed-country exports is presented as well. The methodology also yields estimates of commissioner-specific fixed effects. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 30 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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