IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecb/ecbwps/20202349.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Banking supervision, monetary policy and risk-taking: big data evidence from 15 credit registers

Author

Listed:
  • Altavilla, Carlo
  • Boucinha, Miguel
  • Peydró, José-Luis
  • Smets, Frank

Abstract

We analyse the effects of supranational versus national banking supervision on credit supply, and its interactions with monetary policy. For identification, we exploit: (i) a new, proprietary dataset based on 15 European credit registers; (ii) the institutional change leading to the centralisation of European banking supervision; (iii) high-frequency monetary policy surprises; (iv) differences across euro area countries, also vis-à-vis non-euro area countries. We show that supranational supervision reduces credit supply to firms with very high ex-ante and ex-post credit risk, while stimulating credit supply to firms without loan delinquencies. Moreover, the increased risk-sensitivity of credit supply driven by centralised supervision is stronger for banks operating in stressed countries. Exploiting heterogeneity across banks, we find that the mechanism driving the results is higher quantity and quality of human resources available to the supranational supervisor rather than changes in incentives due to the reallocation of supervisory responsibility to the new institution. Finally, there are crucial complementarities between supervision and monetary policy: centralised supervision offsets excessive bank risk-taking induced by a more accommodative monetary policy stance, but does not offset more productive risk-taking. Overall, we show that using multiple credit registers – first time in the literature – is crucial for external validity. JEL Classification: E51, E52, E58, G01, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Altavilla, Carlo & Boucinha, Miguel & Peydró, José-Luis & Smets, Frank, 2020. "Banking supervision, monetary policy and risk-taking: big data evidence from 15 credit registers," Working Paper Series 2349, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20202349
    Note: 2279334
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2349~515abecc84.en.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Altavilla, Carlo & Brugnolini, Luca & Gürkaynak, Refet S. & Motto, Roberto & Ragusa, Giuseppe, 2019. "Measuring euro area monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 162-179.
    2. George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, 1993. "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2), pages 1-74.
    3. Itamar Drechsler & Alexi Savov & Philipp Schnabl, 2017. "The Deposits Channel of Monetary Policy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(4), pages 1819-1876.
    4. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner & Matthew Plosser, 2020. "The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(5), pages 2765-2808, October.
    5. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2022. "Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade‐Offs and Outcomes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1685-1736, June.
    6. Ernesto Dal Bó & Frederico Finan & Martín A. Rossi, 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(3), pages 1169-1218.
    7. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    8. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1089-1127.
    9. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(2), pages 173-192, Spring.
    10. Gai, Prasanna & Kemp, Malcolm & Sánchez Serrano, Antonio & Schnabel, Isabel, 2019. "Regulatory complexity and the quest for robust regulation," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 8, European Systemic Risk Board.
    11. Nicola Gennaioli & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2013. "Human Capital and Regional Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(1), pages 105-164.
    12. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A., 2005. "Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 385-472, Elsevier.
    13. Raghuram G. Rajan, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441.
    14. Stewart C. Myers & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1998. "The Paradox of Liquidity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 113(3), pages 733-771.
    15. Jiménez, Gabriel & Ongena, Steven & Peydró, José-Luis & Saurina, Jesús, 2012. "Credit Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet Channel with Loan Applications," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 2301-2326.
    16. Daniel Paravisini, 2008. "Local Bank Financial Constraints and Firm Access to External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(5), pages 2161-2193, October.
    17. Sumit Agarwal & David Lucca & Amit Seru & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 129(2), pages 889-938.
    18. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2008. "Tracing the Impact of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an Emerging Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1413-1442, September.
    19. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2013. "Regulatory Capture by Sophistication," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79991, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    20. Elena Carletti & Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2021. "Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 455-470, January.
    21. Bernanke, Ben S & Blinder, Alan S, 1988. "Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 435-439, May.
    22. Bernanke, Ben S & Blinder, Alan S, 1992. "The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary Transmission," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 901-921, September.
    23. Weiss, Andrew W, 1980. "Job Queues and Layoffs in Labor Markets with Flexible Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 526-538, June.
    24. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1369-1401, December.
    25. Robert G. King & Ross Levine, 1993. "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 717-737.
    26. Thorsten Beck & Radomir Todorov & Wolf Wagner, 2013. "Supervising cross-border banks: theory, evidence and policy [Is the international convergence of capital adequacy regulation desirable?]," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 28(73), pages 5-44.
    27. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2012. "Illiquid Banks, Financial Stability, and Interest Rate Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(3), pages 552-591.
    28. Gabriel Jiménez & Steven Ongena & José‐Luis Peydró & Jesús Saurina, 2014. "Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty‐Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk‐Taking?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 463-505, March.
    29. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2016. "The Economics of Bank Supervision: So Much to Do, So Little Time," Liberty Street Economics 20160412, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    30. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    31. Rafael Repullo, 2018. "Hierarchical bank supervision," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 1-26, March.
    32. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008. "Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262062704, September.
    33. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico & Suarez, Javier, 2019. "Bank capital forbearance," ESRB Working Paper Series 93, European Systemic Risk Board.
    34. Ms. Deniz O Igan & Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond," IMF Working Papers 2019/171, International Monetary Fund.
    35. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Luc Laeven & Gustavo A. Suarez, 2017. "Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(2), pages 613-654, April.
    36. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    37. João Granja & Christian Leuz, 2017. "The Death of a Regulator: Strict Supervision, Bank Lending, and Business Activity," NBER Working Papers 24168, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    38. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    39. Philipp Schnabl, 2012. "The International Transmission of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from an Emerging Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(3), pages 897-932, June.
    40. Ricardo J. Caballero & Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, 2008. "Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1943-1977, December.
    41. Freixas, Xavier & Laeven, Luc & Peydró, José-Luis, 2015. "Systemic Risk, Crises, and Macroprudential Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262028697, September.
    42. Adrian, Tobias & Song Shin, Hyun, 2010. "Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 12, pages 601-650, Elsevier.
    43. Laffont, J.-J., 1999. "Political Economy, Information and Incentives," Papers 99.516, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    44. M. Dewatripont & E. Maskin, 1995. "Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 541-555.
    45. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 232-262, Summer.
    46. repec:oup:ecpoli:v:28:y:2013:i:73:p:5-44 is not listed on IDEAS
    47. Jeremy C. Stein & Anil K. Kashyap, 2000. "What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the Transmission of Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 407-428, June.
    48. George A. Akerlof, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-569.
    49. Atif Mian, 2006. "Distance Constraints: The Limits of Foreign Lending in Poor Economies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1465-1505, June.
    50. Rafael Repullo, 2017. "Hierarchical Bank Supervision," Working Papers wp2018_1718, CEMFI.
    51. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2001. "The Transmission Mechanism and the Role of Asset Prices in Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    52. David H. Romer & Christina D. Romer, 2000. "Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 429-457, June.
    53. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, September.
    54. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1999. "Political economy, information and incentives1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 649-669, April.
    55. Mary Amiti & David E. Weinstein, 2011. "Exports and Financial Shocks," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1841-1877.
    56. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2016. "The Economics of Bank Supervision," NBER Working Papers 22201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    57. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
    58. Thomas M. Eisenbach & Andrew F. Haughwout & Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner & David O. Lucca & Matthew Plosser, 2017. "Supervising large, complex financial institutions: what do supervisors do?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 23-1, pages 57-77.
    59. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Coimbra, Nuno & Kim, Daisoon & Rey, Hélène, 2022. "Central Bank Policy and the concentration of risk: Empirical estimates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 182-198.
    2. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2022. "Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade‐Offs and Outcomes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1685-1736, June.
    3. Melchisedek Joslem Ngambou Djatche, 2020. "Monetary Policy, Prudential Policy, and Bank's Risk-Taking: A Literature Review," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-40, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    4. Altavilla, Carlo & Laeven, Luc & Peydró, José Luis, 2020. "Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Complementarities: evidence from European credit registers," CEPR Discussion Papers 15539, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner, 2020. "Bank Supervision," Staff Reports 952, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    6. Carlo Altavilla & Miguel Boucinha & Lorenzo Burlon, 2020. "The Economic Consequences of Negative Interest Rates," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 21(01), pages 13-17, April.
    7. João Granja & Christian Leuz, 2017. "The Death of a Regulator: Strict Supervision, Bank Lending, and Business Activity," NBER Working Papers 24168, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Albertazzi, Ugo & Barbiero, Francesca & Marqués-Ibáñez, David & Popov, Alexander & Rodriguez d’Acri, Costanza & Vlassopoulos, Thomas, 2020. "Monetary policy and bank stability: the analytical toolbox reviewed," Working Paper Series 2377, European Central Bank.
    9. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner, 2022. "Bank Supervision," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 39-56, November.
    10. Bank for International Settlements, 2019. "Unconventional monetary policy tools: a cross-country analysis," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 63.
    11. Couaillier, Cyril & Lo Duca, Marco & Reghezza, Alessio & Rodriguez d’Acri, Costanza, 2022. "Caution: do not cross! Capital buffers and lending in Covid-19 times," Working Paper Series 2644, European Central Bank.
    12. Barbieri, Claudio & Couaillier, Cyril & Perales, Cristian & Rodriguez d’Acri, Costanza, 2022. "Informing macroprudential policy choices using credit supply and demand decompositions," Working Paper Series 2702, European Central Bank.
    13. Barbiero, Francesca & Burlon, Lorenzo & Dimou, Maria & Toczynski, Jan, 2022. "Targeted monetary policy, dual rates and bank risk taking," Working Paper Series 2682, European Central Bank.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peydró, José-Luis & Polo, Andrea & Sette, Enrico, 2021. "Monetary policy at work: Security and credit application registers evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(3), pages 789-814.
    2. Valentina Michelangeli & José-Luis Peydró & Enrico Sette, 2021. "Borrower versus Ban Channels in Lending: Experimental- and Administrative-Based Evidence," Working Papers 1307, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Altavilla, Carlo & Laeven, Luc & Peydró, José Luis, 2020. "Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Complementarities: evidence from European credit registers," CEPR Discussion Papers 15539, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Valentina Michelangeli & José-Luis Peydró & Enrico Sette, 2020. "Credit demand versus supply channels: Experimental- and administrative-based evidence," Economics Working Papers 1731, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2021.
    5. Michelangeli, Valentina & Peydró, José Luis & Sette, Enrico, 2020. "Credit demand vs. supply channels: Experimental- and administrative-based evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 15276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Stijn Claessens & M Ayhan Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 95, June.
    7. Benetton, Matteo & Fantino, Davide, 2021. "Targeted monetary policy and bank lending behavior," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 404-429.
    8. Jasova, Martina & Mendicino, Caterina & Panetti, Ettore & Peydró, José Luis & Supera, Dominik, 2021. "Monetary Policy, Labor Income Redistribution and the Credit Channel: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee and Credit Registers," CEPR Discussion Papers 16549, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Abbassi, Puriya & Iyer, Rajkamal & Peydró, José-Luis & Soto, Paul, 2020. "Stressed Banks? Evidence from the Largest-Ever Supervisory Review," EconStor Preprints 217048, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    10. De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca & Ponce, Jorge, 2018. "Flexible and mandatory banking supervision," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 86-104.
    11. Ozan Güler & Mike Mariathasan & Klaas Mulier & Nejat G. Okatan, 2021. "The real effects of banks' corporate credit supply: A literature review," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(3), pages 1252-1285, July.
    12. van Holle, Frederiek, 2017. "Essays in empirical finance and monetary policy," Other publications TiSEM 30d11a4b-7bc9-4c81-ad24-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    13. Dong Beom Choi & Hyun-Soo Choi, 2021. "The Effect of Monetary Policy on Bank Wholesale Funding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 388-416, January.
    14. Morais, Bernardo & Peydró, José-Luis & Roldán Peña, Jessica & Ruiz Ortega, Claudia, 2019. "The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply, Reach-for-Yield, and Real Effects," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 55-90.
    15. Gabriel Jiménez & Steven Ongena & José‐Luis Peydró & Jesús Saurina, 2014. "Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty‐Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk‐Taking?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 463-505, March.
    16. Vasso Ioannidou & Steven Ongena & José-Luis Peydró, 2015. "Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking, and Pricing: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(1), pages 95-144.
    17. Bottero, Margherita & Minoiu, Camelia & Peydró, José-Luis & Polo, Andrea & Presbitero, Andrea F. & Sette, Enrico, 2022. "Expansionary yet different: Credit supply and real effects of negative interest rate policy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 754-778.
    18. Philippe Andrade & Christophe Cahn & Henri Fraisse & Jean-Stéphane Mésonnier, 2019. "Can the Provision of Long-Term Liquidity Help to Avoid a Credit Crunch? Evidence from the Eurosystem’s LTRO," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1070-1106.
    19. Mattia Girotti, 2021. "How monetary policy changes bank liability structure and funding cost," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 49-75.
    20. Delis, Manthos & Hong, Sizhe & Paltalidis, Nikos & Philip, Dennis, 2020. "Forward Guidance and Corporate Lending," MPRA Paper 98159, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    AnaCredit; banking; euro area crisis; monetary policy; supervision;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20202349. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/emieude.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Official Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/emieude.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.