IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fednsr/768.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The impact of supervision on bank performance

Author

Abstract

We explore the impact of supervision on the riskiness, profitability, and growth of U.S. banks. Using data on supervisors? time use, we demonstrate that the top-ranked banks by size within a supervisory district receive more attention from supervisors, even after controlling for size, complexity, risk, and other characteristics. Using a matched sample approach, we find that these top-ranked banks that receive more supervisory attention hold less risky loan portfolios and are less volatile and less sensitive to industry downturns, but do not have slower growth or profitability. Our results underscore the distinct role of supervision in mitigating banking sector risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner & Matthew Plosser, 2016. "The impact of supervision on bank performance," Staff Reports 768, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:768
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr768.html
    File Function: Summary
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr768.pdf?la=en
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Berger, Allen N & Davies, Sally M & Flannery, Mark J, 2000. "Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 641-667, August.
    2. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "Bank regulation and the credit crunch," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 679-692, June.
    3. Nicola Cetorelli & Samuel Stern, 2015. "Same Name, New Businesses: Evolution in the Bank Holding Company," Liberty Street Economics 20150928, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, 1996. "The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(3), pages 639-670.
    5. Bassett, William F. & Lee, Seung Jung & Spiller, Thomas Popeck, 2015. "Estimating changes in supervisory standards and their economic effects," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 21-43.
    6. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2008. "Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 49-100.
    7. Manthos D. Delis & Panagiotis K. Staikouras, 2011. "Supervisory Effectiveness and Bank Risk," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 15(3), pages 511-543.
    8. Allen Berger & Sally Davies, 1998. "The Information Content of Bank Examinations," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 14(2), pages 117-144, October.
    9. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 1994. "The Firm as a Communication Network," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 809-839.
    10. Kovner, Anna & Vickery, James & Zhou, Lily, 2015. "Do big banks have lower operating costs?," Journal of Financial Perspectives, EY Global FS Institute, vol. 3(1), pages 157-196.
    11. Barth, James R. & Lin, Chen & Ma, Yue & Seade, Jesús & Song, Frank M., 2013. "Do bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 2879-2892.
    12. Curry, Timothy J. & Fissel, Gary S. & Ramirez, Carlos D., 2008. "The impact of bank supervision on loan growth," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 113-134, August.
    13. James, Christopher M & Wier, Peggy, 1987. "Returns to Acquirers and Competition in the Acquisition Market: The Case of Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(2), pages 355-370, April.
    14. John Krainer & Jose A. Lopez, 2009. "Do supervisory rating standards change over time?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 13-24.
    15. Klomp, Jeroen & Haan, Jakob de, 2012. "Banking risk and regulation: Does one size fit all?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3197-3212.
    16. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2016. "The Economics of Bank Supervision," NBER Working Papers 22201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Allen N. Berger & Margaret K. Kyle & Joseph M. Scalise, 2001. "Did US Bank Supervisors Get Tougher during the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier during the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending?," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 301-356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Donald P. Morgan & Bertrand Rime & Philip E. Strahan, 2004. "Bank Integration and State Business Cycles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1555-1584.
    19. Donald Morgan & Bertrand Rime & Philip Strahan, 2003. "Bank Integration and State Business Cycles," NBER Working Papers 9704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Elizabeth K. Kiser & Robin A. Prager & Jason R. Scott, 2012. "Supervisor ratings and the contraction of bank lending to small businesses," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-59, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    21. Rebecca Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahan, 1996. "Banks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of franchise value," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 2(Oct), pages 1-14.
    22. Edward I. Altman, 1968. "Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis And The Prediction Of Corporate Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 23(4), pages 589-609, September.
    23. Thomas M. Eisenbach & Andrew F. Haughwout & Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner & David O. Lucca & Matthew Plosser, 2017. "Supervising large, complex financial institutions: what do supervisors do?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 23-1, pages 57-77.
    24. Geanakoplos, John & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "A theory of hierarchies based on limited managerial attention," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 205-225, September.
    25. Sumit Agarwal & David Lucca & Amit Seru & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(2), pages 889-938.
    26. Edward I. Altman, 1968. "The Prediction Of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Discriminant Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 23(1), pages 193-194, March.
    27. Bassett, William F. & Marsh, W. Blake, 2017. "Assessing targeted macroprudential financial regulation: The case of the 2006 commercial real estate guidance for banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 209-228.
    28. Thomas M. Eisenbach & Andrew F. Haughwout & Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner & David O. Lucca & Matthew Plosser, 2015. "Supervising large, complex financial companies: what do supervisors do?," Staff Reports 729, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    29. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2001. "Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number mish01-1, March.
    30. Moyer, Susan E., 1990. "Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in commercial banks," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 123-154, July.
    31. Bridges, Jonathan & Gregory, David & Nielsen, Mette & Pezzini, Silvia & Radia, Amar & Spaltro, Marco, 2014. "The impact of capital requirements on bank lending," Bank of England working papers 486, Bank of England.
    32. Luis Garicano, 2000. "Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 874-904, October.
    33. Boyd, John H. & Graham, Stanley L. & Hewitt, R. Shawn, 1993. "Bank holding company mergers with nonbank financial firms: Effects on the risk of failure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 43-63, February.
    34. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-1146, September.
    35. Hannan, Timothy H & Hanweck, Gerald A, 1988. "Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large Certificates of Deposit," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 203-211, May.
    36. Beverly Hirtle & Jose A. Lopez, 1999. "Supervisory information and the frequency of bank examinations," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 5(Apr), pages 1-20.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hans Degryse & Sanja Jakovljević & Steven Ongena, 2015. "A Review of Empirical Research on the Design and Impact of Regulation in the Banking Sector," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 423-443, December.
    2. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner, 2022. "Bank Supervision," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 39-56, November.
    3. Franco Fiordelisi & Gabriele Lattanzio & Davide S. Mare, 2022. "How binding is supervisory guidance? Evidence from the European calendar provisioning," Working Papers 2022/05, Nazarbayev University, Graduate School of Business.
    4. John Kandrac & Bernd Schlusche, 2017. "The Effect of Bank Supervision on Risk Taking : Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-079, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Shaddady, Ali & Moore, Tomoe, 2019. "Investigation of the effects of financial regulation and supervision on bank stability: The application of CAMELS-DEA to quantile regressions," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 96-116.
    6. Chen, Qi & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2017. "The effects of bank mergers on corporate information disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 56-77.
    7. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2022. "Resource Allocation in Bank Supervision: Trade‐Offs and Outcomes," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(3), pages 1685-1736, June.
    8. Bassett, William F. & Lee, Seung Jung & Spiller, Thomas Popeck, 2015. "Estimating changes in supervisory standards and their economic effects," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 21-43.
    9. Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Beverly Hirtle & David O. Lucca, 2016. "Parsing the content of bank supervision," Staff Reports 770, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    10. Thomas M. Eisenbach & David O. Lucca & Robert M. Townsend, 2016. "The Economics of Bank Supervision," NBER Working Papers 22201, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Shofiqur Rahman, 2020. "Credit supply and capital structure adjustments," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 49(4), pages 949-972, December.
    12. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2007. "Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1759-1799.
    13. Lepetit, Laetitia & Strobel, Frank, 2015. "Bank insolvency risk and Z-score measures: A refinement," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 214-224.
    14. Smolyansky, Michael, 2019. "Policy externalities and banking integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(3), pages 118-139.
    15. Andrea Patacconi, 2009. "Coordination and delay in hierarchies," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 190-208, March.
    16. Francesco Marchionne & Michele Fratianni & Federico Giri & Luca Papi, 2022. "Frequency vs. Size of Bank Fines in Local Credit Markets," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 8(3), pages 549-583, November.
    17. Beck, Thorsten & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Resolution of failed banks by deposit insurers : cross-country evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3920, The World Bank.
    18. Hoang, Daniel & Gatzer, Sebastian & Ruckes, Martin E., 2018. "The economics of capital allocation in firms: Evidence from internal capital markets," Working Paper Series in Economics 115, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    19. José María Liberti & Mitchell A. Petersen, 2018. "Information: Hard and Soft," NBER Working Papers 25075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Peresetsky, A. A., 2011. "What factors drive the Russian banks license withdrawal," MPRA Paper 41507, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank supervision; bank regulation; bank performance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:768. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Gabriella Bucciarelli (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbnyus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.