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Bank Supervision

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Abstract

We provide a critical review of the empirical and theoretical literature on bank supervision. The review focuses on microprudential supervision: the supervision of individual banking institutions aimed at assessing the financial and operational health of those firms. Theory suggests that supervision is required both to ensure compliance with regulation but also to allow for the use of soft information in mitigating externalities of bank failure. Empirically, more intensive supervision results in reduced risk-taking, but there is less consensus on whether the risk-reducing impact of supervision comes at the cost of reduced credit supply. Theoretical costs and benefits of supervisory disclosure have been outlined, and this disclosure is informative to investors. However, it is difficult to identify the impact of disclosure distinct from supervisory and regulatory changes.

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  • Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner, 2020. "Bank Supervision," Staff Reports 952, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:89213
    Note: Revised December 2021. Previous title: “Banking Supervision: The Perspective from Economics”
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking; supervision; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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