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Enforcement of banking regulation and the cost of borrowing

Author

Listed:
  • Yota Deli
  • Manthos D. Delis
  • Iftekhar Hasan
  • Liuling Liu

Abstract

We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997–2014, we find that enforcement actions decrease the total cost of borrowing by approximately 22 basis points (or $4.6 million interest for the average loan). We attribute our finding to a competition-reputation effect that works over and above the lower risk of punished banks post-enforcement and survives in a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that this effect persists for approximately four years post-enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Yota Deli & Manthos D. Delis & Iftekhar Hasan & Liuling Liu, 2019. "Enforcement of banking regulation and the cost of borrowing," Open Access publications 10197/9909, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucn:oapubs:10197/9909
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    Cited by:

    1. Ma, Yong & Chen, Diandian, 2025. "How green credit policies drive green innovation: evidence from a natural experiment in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    2. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner, 2022. "Bank Supervision," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 39-56, November.
    3. Francesco Marchionne & Michele Fratianni & Federico Giri & Luca Papi, 2022. "Frequency vs. Size of Bank Fines in Local Credit Markets," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 8(3), pages 549-583, November.
    4. Huang, Yuanbiao & Li, Jinlei, 2025. "Regulatory enforcement actions and bank liquidity creation: Evidence from China," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    5. Zbigniew Korzeb & Michał Bernardelli & Paweł Niedziółka, 2025. "Enforcement actions against European banks in the years 2005–2022. Do financial penalties imposed on European banks follow any patterns?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 26(1), pages 41-53, March.
    6. Boni, Leslie & Leach, J. Chris & White, Reilly S., 2021. "Crisis and non-crisis short selling and bank enforcement actions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    7. Tracey, Belinda & Sowerbutts, Rhiannon, 2025. "How do banks respond to misconduct costs?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    8. Álvarez-Botas, Celia & González, Víctor M., 2021. "Does trust matter for the cost of bank loans?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    9. He, Zhongda & Qiao, Guannan & Zhang, Le & Zhang, Wenrui, 2021. "Regulator supervisory power and bank loan contracting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    10. Hasan, Iftekhar & Kim, Suk-Joong & Politsidis, Panagiotis N. & Wu, Eliza, 2021. "Loan syndication under Basel II: How do firm credit ratings affect the cost of credit?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    11. Nguyen, Thanh Cong & Thuy, Tien Ho, 2023. "Geopolitical risk and the cost of bank loans," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    12. Panagiota Papadimitri & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2020. "Lobbying and Enforcement: Theory and Application to Bank Regulation," Working Papers 2020-01, Swansea University, School of Management.
    13. Shaffer, Sherrill & Spierdijk, Laura, 2020. "Measuring multi-product banks’ market power using the Lerner index," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    14. Nadia Nahar Purkayastha & Şule Erdem Tuzlukaya, 2020. "Determination Of The Benefits And Risks Of Peer-To-Peer (P2p) Lending: A Social Network Teory Approach," Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 9(3), pages 131-143.
    15. Arnaboldi, F. & Casu, B. & Gallo, A. & Kalotychou, E. & Sarkisyan, A., 2021. "Gender diversity and bank misconduct," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    16. Leonardo Gambacorta & Nico Lauridsen & Samir Kiuhan-Vásquez & Jermy Prenio, 2025. "Making suptech work: evidence on the key drivers of adoption," BIS Working Papers 1309, Bank for International Settlements.
    17. Huang, Yuanbiao & Li, Jinlei, 2025. "Banking regulation and corporate R&D investment: Evidence from regulatory penalties in China," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    18. Karavitis, Panagiotis & Kazakis, Pantelis, 2022. "Political sentiment and syndicated loan borrowing costs of multinational enterprises," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    19. Sara Alfaihani & Oleg Badunenko & Shabbar Jaffry, 2025. "Market power, optimal scale and competition promotion in banking: Analysis in the GCC region," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(2), pages 1649-1670, April.
    20. Tan, Brandon & Igan, Deniz & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Pierri, Nicola & Presbitero, Andrea F., 2021. "Government intervention and bank markups: Lessons from the global financial crisis for the COVID-19 crisis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    21. Nicolás Gambetta & Fernando Azcárate-Llanes & Laura Sierra-García & María Antonia García-Benau, 2021. "Financial Institutions’ Risk Profile and Contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(14), pages 1-15, July.
    22. Ke, Konglin & Xu, Wanting & He, Yujie, 2024. "Do regulatory penalties reduce risk-taking of banks?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    23. Hasan, Iftekhar & Kim, Suk-Joong & Politsidis, Panagiotis N. & Wu, Eliza, 2023. "Regulation and information costs of sovereign distress: Evidence from corporate lending markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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