IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedgfe/94-20.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The information content of bank examinations

Author

Abstract

The role of information acquisition for bank regulators is important for the recognition and possible control of bank risk. This role is also consistent with the modern theory of banking under which banks hold a substantial amount of private information about their loan customers, and by implication, private information about their own conditions. The authors suggest that the main purpose of bank examinations is information acquisition. In order to maintain the safety and soundness of the banking system, regulators conduct regular on-site reviews of operations and determine a composite rating for the institution, known as its CAMEL rating. The authors test whether bank exams do in fact result in significant information acquisition. Their tests involve observation of how capital markets react around the times of examinations and whether these reactions are related to changes in examination ratings. They use event study methodology and track the cumulative abnormal returns on an institution's stock price before and after the examination relative to the predictions of a two-factor market model. Data are for institutions whose stocks were actively traded on major exchanges from 1985-1989 - a relatively stable regulatory regime. The question of whether bank examinations succeed in discovering substantial private information about loan quality and bank risk is crucial to answering policy questions regarding financial system reform. The modern theory of banking often rests on the assumption that are delegated monitors because of scale economies in information acquisition about borrowers. An extension of this theory might suggest that there are economies of scale in "monitoring the monitors". These economies of scale do not necessarily imply that government agencies should be the monitors. However, under the current federal safety net and deposit insurance regime, the federal government bears greater losses than do their creditors in the event of bank failure. One
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Allen N. Berger & Sally M. Davies, 1994. "The information content of bank examinations," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 94-20, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:94-20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653.
    2. Lummer, Scott L. & McConnell, John J., 1989. "Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital-market response to bank loan agreements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 99-122, November.
    3. James B. Thomson & Gary Whalen, 1988. "Using financial data to identify changes in bank condition," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 24(Q II), pages 17-26.
    4. James, Christopher, 1987. "Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 217-235, December.
    5. Berger, Allen N. & King, Kathleen Kuester & O'Brien, James M., 1991. "The limitations of market value accounting and a more realistic alternative," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4-5), pages 753-783, September.
    6. Stephen Cross & Katerina Simons, 1991. "Do capital markets predict problems in large commercial banks?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue May, pages 51-56.
    7. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Dopuch, Nicholas & Holthausen, Robert W. & Leftwich, Richard W., 1986. "Abnormal stock returns associated with media disclosures of `subject to' qualified audit opinions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 93-117, June.
    9. Jones, David S. & King, Kathleen Kuester, 1995. "The implementation of prompt corrective action: An assessment," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 491-510, June.
    10. Sally M. Davies, 1991. "Accounting for prediction variance in event studies," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 173, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric, 1995. "Bank regulation and the credit crunch," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 679-692, June.
    12. Billett, Matthew T & Flannery, Mark J & Garfinkel, Jon A, 1995. "The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(2), pages 699-718, June.
    13. Berger, Allen N & Davies, Sally M & Flannery, Mark J, 2000. "Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 641-667, August.
    14. Hand, John R M & Holthausen, Robert W & Leftwich, Richard W, 1992. "The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 733-752, June.
    15. Holthausen, Robert W. & Leftwich, Richard W., 1986. "The effect of bond rating changes on common stock prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 57-89, September.
    16. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-381, July.
    17. Boyd, John H. & Prescott, Edward C., 1986. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 211-232, April.
    18. Benston, George J & Marlin, John Tepper, 1974. "Bank Examiners' Evaluation of Credit: An Analysis of the Usefulness of Substandard Loan Data," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(1), pages 23-44, February.
    19. Rebel Cole & Jeffery Gunther, 1998. "Predicting Bank Failures: A Comparison of On- and Off-Site Monitoring Systems," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 13(2), pages 103-117, April.
    20. Brown, Stephen J. & Warner, Jerold B., 1985. "Using daily stock returns : The case of event studies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-31, March.
    21. Robert DeYoung & Mark J. Flannery & William W. Lang & Sorin M. Sorescu, 1998. "Could publication of bank CAMEL ratings improve market discipline?," Proceedings 600, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    22. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1998. "Does the Federal Reserve have an informational advantage? you can bank on it," Working Papers 98-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    23. Graham, David R & Humphrey, David Burras, 1978. "Bank Examination Data as Predictors of Bank Net Loan Losses," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(4), pages 491-504, November.
    24. Cole, Rebel A., 1998. "The importance of relationships to the availability of credit," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 959-977, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Allen N. Berger & Margaret K. Kyle & Joseph M. Scalise, 2001. "Did US Bank Supervisors Get Tougher during the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier during the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending?," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 301-356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. João Santos, 1998. "Commercial Banks in the Securities Business: A Review," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 14(1), pages 35-60, July.
    3. N. Berger, Allen & F. Udell, Gregory, 1998. "The economics of small business finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 613-673, August.
    4. Berger, Allen N & Davies, Sally M & Flannery, Mark J, 2000. "Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 641-667, August.
    5. Ongena, S. & Smith, D.C., 2000. "Bank relationships : A review," Other publications TiSEM 993b88a5-9a0f-42de-9cec-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Robert DeYoung & Mark J. Flannery & William W. Lang & Sorin M. Sorescu, 1998. "The informational advantage of specialized monitors: the case of bank examiners," Working Paper Series WP-98-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    7. Udell, Gregory F., 2008. "What's in a relationship The case of commercial lending," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 93-103.
    8. Linda Allen & Julapa Jagtiani & James Moser, 2001. "Further Evidence on the Information Content of Bank Examination Ratings: A Study of BHC-to-FHC Conversion Applications," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 20(2), pages 213-232, October.
    9. Foroughfard, Rasoul & Rahmati, Mohammad, 2019. "The Effect of Relationship Lending on Loan Contract Terms," Journal of Money and Economy, Monetary and Banking Research Institute, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, vol. 14(2), pages 133-157, April.
    10. Brewer, Elijah III & Genay, Hesna & Hunter, William Curt & Kaufman, George G., 2003. "The value of banking relationships during a financial crisis: Evidence from failures of Japanese banks," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 233-262, September.
    11. Li, Chunshuo & Ongena, Steven, 2015. "Bank loan announcements and borrower stock returns before and during the recent financial crisis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 1-12.
    12. Victor Gonzalez, 1997. "La valoración por el mercado de capitales español de la financiación bancaria y de las emisiones de obligaciones," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 21(1), pages 111-128, January.
    13. Brick, Ivan E. & Palia, Darius, 2007. "Evidence of jointness in the terms of relationship lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 452-476, July.
    14. Peter Nigro & Kevin Jacques, 2000. "Financial Turmoil, Failed Bank Acquisitions, and Bank Business Lending Behavior," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 17(2), pages 149-164, August.
    15. DeYoung, Robert E. & Hughes, Joseph P. & Moon, Choon-Geol, 2001. "Efficient risk-taking and regulatory covenant enforcement in a deregulated banking industry," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(2-3), pages 255-282.
    16. Steven Ongena, 1999. "Lending Relationships, Bank Default and Economic Activity," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(2), pages 257-280.
    17. Rocholl, Jörg & Puri, Manju & Steffen, Sascha, 2011. "On the importance of prior relationships in bank loans to retail customers," Working Paper Series 1395, European Central Bank.
    18. Djedidi-Kooli, Salima, 2009. "L’accès au financement des PME en France : quel rôle joué par la structure du système bancaire ?," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/8354 edited by Etner, François.
    19. Elyasiani, Elyas & Goldberg, Lawrence G., 2004. "Relationship lending: a survey of the literature," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 315-330.
    20. Jalal Akhavein & Lawrence Goldberg & Lawrence White, 2004. "Small Banks, Small Business, and Relationships: An Empirical Study of Lending to Small Farms," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 26(3), pages 245-261, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank supervision; bank examinations;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:94-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ryan Wolfslayer ; Keisha Fournillier (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbgvus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.