Political economy, information and incentives1
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-147, March.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, January.
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000.
"A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs,"
Annals of Economics and Finance,
Society for AEF, vol. 1(2), pages 231-263, November.
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1998. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 356, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1999. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," CEMA Working Papers 21, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics, revised Oct 2000.
- Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 1967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "A theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19356, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Persson, T & Roland, G & Tabellini, G, 1996.
"Sparation of Powers and Accountability : Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics,"
Papers
612, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Separation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1475, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of powers and accountability: Towards a formal approach to comparative politics," Seminar Papers 612, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000.
"Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," IDEI Working Papers 81, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Meleu, Methieu, 1997. " Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 519-540, December.
- Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1976.
"Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
- Sam Peltzman, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," NBER Working Papers 0133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-1257, November.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1996. "Industrial policy and politics," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Vogt-Schilb, Adrien & Hallegatte, Stéphane, 2014.
"Marginal abatement cost curves and the optimal timing of mitigation measures,"
Energy Policy,
Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 645-653.
- Vogt-Schilb, Adrien & Hallegatte, Stephane, 2011. "When starting with the most expensive option makes sense : use and misuse of marginal abatement cost curves," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5803, The World Bank.
- Adrien Vogt-Schilb & Stéphane Hallegatte, 2013. "Marginal Abatement Cost Curves and the Optimal Timing of Mitigation Measures," Working Papers 2013.89, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Adrien Vogt-Schilb & Stéphane Hallegatte, 2014. "Marginal abatement cost curves and the optimal timing of mitigation measures," Post-Print hal-00916328, HAL.
- Adrien Vogt-Schilb & Stéphane Hallegatte, 2013. "When Starting with the Most Expensive Option Makes Sense On Marginal Abatement Cost Curves and Optimal Abatement Pathways," CIRED Working Papers hal-00626261, HAL.
- Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008.
"Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 531-559, May.
- Matthias Dahm & Nicolas Porteiro, 2005. "Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure," Discussion Papers 1409, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Informational Lobbying under the Shadow of Political Pressure," Working Papers 06.14, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2012.
"Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China,"
Public Choice,
Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 745-769, March.
- John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2011. "Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China," Working Papers 201102, Utah State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
- John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2011. "Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China," Working Papers 2011-02, Utah State University, Department of Economics.
- Adrien Vogt-Schilb & Guy Meunier & Stéphane Hallegatte, 2013.
"Should marginal abatement costs differ across sectors? The effect of low-carbon capital accumulation,"
CIRED Working Papers
hal-00850682, HAL.
- Adrien Vogt-Schilb & Guy Meunier & Hallegatte Stéphane, 2013. "Should marginal abatement costs differ across sectors? The effect of low-carbon capital accumulation," Post-Print hal-00829420, HAL.
- Adrien Vogt-Schilb & Guy Meunier & Stéphane Hallegatte, 2013. "Should marginal abatement costs differ across sectors? The effect of low-carbon capital accumulation," Post-Print hal-00816796, HAL.
- Vogt-Schilb, Adrien & Meunier, Guy & Hallegatte, Stephane, 2013. "Should marginal abatement costs differ across sectors ? the effect of low-carbon capital accumulation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6415, The World Bank.
- Ragazzi, Giorgio, 2005. "Tolls and Project Financing: A Critical View," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 41-53, January.
- Dementiev, Andrei & Loboyko, Anfisa, 2014. "Trusting partnerships in a regulatory game: The case of suburban railway transport in Russia," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 209-220.
- Francesco Giuli & Marco Manzo, 2005. "Protecting Savings: Do We Need a Supervision Authority?," Working Papers 84, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
- Hallegatte, Stephane & Fay, Marianne & Vogt-Schilb, Adrien, 2013. "Green industrial policies : when and how," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6677, The World Bank.
- Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2016. "Peer discipline and incentives within groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 19-30.
- Bhattacharya, Sourav & Kundu, Tapas, 2014. "Resistance, redistribution and investor-friendliness," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 124-142.
- Hallegatte, Stephane & Heal, Geoffrey & Fay, Marianne & Treguer, David, 2011.
"From growth to green growth -- a framework,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
5872, The World Bank.
- Stéphane Hallegatte & Geoffrey Heal & Marianne Fay & David Treguer, 2012. "From Growth to Green Growth - a Framework," NBER Working Papers 17841, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eric Maskin, 2004.
"Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 913-923, September.
- Eric Maskin, 2004. "Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back," Economics Working Papers 0043, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- DAHM, Matthias & PORTEIRO, Nicolas, 2003.
"The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2003057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Nicolas Porteiro & Matthias Dahm, 2004. "The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 352, Econometric Society.
- Jellal, Mohamed, 2014. "Theory of civil war under asymmetric information," MPRA Paper 57600, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Laussel, Didier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2012. "When the squeakiest wheel gets the most oil: Exploiting one's nuisance power," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1593-1606.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:43:y:1999:i:4-6:p:649-669. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.