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Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China

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Abstract

We consider the potential influence of contributions from interest groups to political rivals in the voting behavior of US legislators on international trade policy issues. Our application addresses the determinants of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China decision, and focuses particular attention on the agriculture/agribusiness lobby. A simultaneous voting-net contributions model suggests that these contributions were very effective relative to organized labor and other corporate groups, despite their relatively small dollar value. Possible explanations arising from differences in targeting strategies are explored.

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  • John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2011. "Net Campaign Contributions, Agricultural Interests, and Votes on Liberalizing Trade with China," Working Papers 201102, Utah State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:uth:wpaper:201102
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    Cited by:

    1. Malcolm, Michael, 2017. "Do local exports impact congressional voting on free trade agreements?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 31-34.
    2. Che, Yi & Xiao, Rui, 2020. "Import competition, fast-track authority and U.S. policy toward China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 974-996.
    3. Yi Che & Yi Lu & Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott & Zhigang Tao, 2016. "Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?," NBER Working Papers 22178, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Oladi, Reza & Gilbert, John, 2022. "Electoral rivalry and financial campaign contributions: The case of US Congressional elections," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 822-834.
    5. Timini, Jacopo, 2020. "Staying dry on Spanish wine: The rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    6. Che, Yi & Lu, Yi & Pierce, Justin R. & Schott, Peter K. & Tao, Zhigang, 2022. "Did trade liberalization with China influence US elections?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade policy; agricultural political economy; binary choice models; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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