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Do local exports impact congressional voting on free trade agreements?

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  • Malcolm, Michael

Abstract

The United States is currently a party to 14 free trade agreements, which cover 20 countries. This paper explores a new aspect of economic-interest models of legislative support for trade openness, using updated data on more recent trade agreements. I show that House and Senate members are more likely to vote in favor of trade agreements when their states have higher exports to the country that is the subject of the agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Malcolm, Michael, 2017. "Do local exports impact congressional voting on free trade agreements?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 31-34.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:31-34
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.018
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    Cited by:

    1. Timini, Jacopo, 2020. "Staying dry on Spanish wine: The rejection of the 1905 Spanish-Italian trade agreement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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