IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v154y2017icp31-34.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do local exports impact congressional voting on free trade agreements?

Author

Listed:
  • Malcolm, Michael

Abstract

The United States is currently a party to 14 free trade agreements, which cover 20 countries. This paper explores a new aspect of economic-interest models of legislative support for trade openness, using updated data on more recent trade agreements. I show that House and Senate members are more likely to vote in favor of trade agreements when their states have higher exports to the country that is the subject of the agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Malcolm, Michael, 2017. "Do local exports impact congressional voting on free trade agreements?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 31-34.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:31-34
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.018
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176517300630
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xenia Matschke & Shane M. Sherlund, 2006. "Do Labor Issues Matter in the Determination of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 405-421, March.
    2. Conconi, Paola & Facchini, Giovanni & Steinhardt, Max & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2012. "The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress," CEPR Discussion Papers 9270, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Baldwin, Robert E & Magee, Christopher S, 2000. "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 79-101, October.
    4. John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2012. "Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 745-769, March.
    5. Giovanni Facchini & Tommaso Frattini & Cora Signorotto, 2013. "Mind What Your Voters Read: Media Exposure and International Economic Policy Making," Development Working Papers 358, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    6. Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy through majority voting: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 107-133, October.
    7. Mayda, Anna Maria & Rodrik, Dani, 2005. "Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1393-1430, August.
    8. Beaulieu, Eugene, 2002. "The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem Faces Congress," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 343-360, May.
    9. Banri Ito, 2015. "Does electoral competition affect politicians’ trade policy preferences? Evidence from Japan," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 165(3), pages 239-261, December.
    10. Eugene Beaulieu & Christopher Magee, 2004. "Four Simple Tests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Policy Preferences," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 163-187, July.
    11. Ito, Banri, 2015. "Does electoral strength affect politician's trade policy preferences? Evidence from Japan," MPRA Paper 62525, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Paola Conconi & Giovanni Facchini & Max F. Steinhardt & Maurizio Zanardi, 2012. "The Political Economy of Trade and Migration: Evidence from the US Congress: CEPR Discussion Paper 9270," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2012-49, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    13. Donald R. Davis & Prachi Mishra, 2007. "Stolper-Samuelson Is Dead: And Other Crimes of Both Theory and Data," NBER Chapters,in: Globalization and Poverty, pages 87-108 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Magee, Christopher, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: an application to the free-rider problem," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 449-471, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Free trade agreements; Political economy; Protectionism;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:31-34. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.