IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/9270.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress

Author

Listed:
  • Zanardi, Maurizio
  • Facchini, Giovanni
  • Conconi, Paola
  • Steinhardt, Max

Abstract

We systematically examine the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that reforms that lower barriers to goods and migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefitting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support both trade and migration liberalization. Still, important differences exist: Democrats favor trade reforms less than Republicans, while the opposite is true for immigration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape support for immigration, but not for trade.

Suggested Citation

  • Zanardi, Maurizio & Facchini, Giovanni & Conconi, Paola & Steinhardt, Max, 2012. "The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress," CEPR Discussion Papers 9270, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9270
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP9270
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
    2. Baldwin, Robert E & Magee, Christopher S, 2000. "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 79-101, October.
    3. Paola Conconi & Giovanni Facchini & Maurizio Zanardi, 2012. "Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 146-189, August.
    4. Anna Maria Mayda & Kevin H. O'Rourke, 2007. "Risk, Government andd Globalization: International Survey Evidence," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp218, IIIS.
    5. Gordon H. Hanson & Antonio Spilimbergo, 2001. "Political economy, sectoral shocks, and border enforcement," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 34(3), pages 612-638, August.
    6. Hainmueller, Jens & Hiscox, Michael J., 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 469-498, April.
    7. Anna Maria Mayda, 2006. "Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 510-530, August.
    8. Conconi, Paola & Facchini, Giovanni & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2014. "Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 102-118.
    9. Dustmann Christian & Preston Ian P, 2007. "Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-41, November.
    10. I. M. Destler, 2005. "American Trade Politics 4th Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 3829, April.
    11. Mayda, Anna Maria & Rodrik, Dani, 2005. "Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1393-1430, August.
    12. Ortega, Francesc, 2005. "Immigration quotas and skill upgrading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1841-1863, September.
    13. James R. MARKUSEN, 2021. "Factor Movements And Commodity Trade As Complements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: BROADENING TRADE THEORY Incorporating Market Realities into Traditional Models, chapter 15, pages 325-340, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    14. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
    15. Peri, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Steingress, Walter, 2015. "Immigration to the U.S.: A problem for the Republicans or the Democrats?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11001, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2011. "Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 114-128, September.
    17. David Greenaway & Douglas R. Nelson, 2006. "The Distinct Political Economies of Trade and Migration Policy: Through the Window of Endogenous Policy Models, with a Focus on North America," Springer Books, in: Rolf J. Langhammer & Federico Foders (ed.), Labor Mobility and the World Economy, pages 295-327, Springer.
    18. Ashley S. Timmer & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 1996. "Racism, Xenophobia or Markets? The Political Economy of Immigration Policy Prior to the Thirties," NBER Working Papers 5867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    20. Claudia Goldin, 1994. "The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United States, 1890 to 1921," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 223-258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Iranzo, Susana & Peri, Giovanni, 2009. "Migration and trade: Theory with an application to the Eastern-Western European integration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 1-19, September.
    22. Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "Introduction to "The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy"," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 1-12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Gordon H. Hanson & Kenneth Scheve & Matthew J. Slaughter, 2007. "Public Finance And Individual Preferences Over Globalization Strategies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 1-33, March.
    24. Ortega Francesc, 2010. "Immigration, Citizenship, and the Size of Government," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-40, March.
    25. Collins, William J & O'Rourke, Kevin Hjortshøj & Williamson, Jeffrey G, 1997. "Were Trade and Factor Mobility Substitutes in History?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1661, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    26. Facchini, Giovanni & Steinhardt, Max Friedrich, 2011. "What drives U.S. immigration policy? Evidence from congressional roll call votes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 734-743.
    27. James M. Snyder & David Strömberg, 2010. "Press Coverage and Political Accountability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(2), pages 355-408, April.
    28. Benhabib, Jess, 1996. "On the political economy of immigration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1737-1743, December.
    29. Bougheas, Spiros & Nelson, Doug, 2013. "On the political economy of high skilled migration and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 206-224.
    30. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    31. Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number gold94-1.
    32. Facchini, Giovanni & Willmann, Gerald, 2005. "The political economy of international factor mobility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 201-219, September.
    33. Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 656-675, September.
    34. Bruce A. Blonigen & David N. Figlio, 2019. "Voting for Protection: Does Direct Foreign Investment Influence Legislator Behavior?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Foreign Direct Investment, chapter 13, pages 447-471, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    35. Zanardi, Maurizio & Facchini, Giovanni & Conconi, Paola, 2011. "Policymakers? Horizon and Trade Reforms," CEPR Discussion Papers 8251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    36. Timothy J. Hatton, 2015. "United States Immigration Policy: The 1965 Act and its Consequences," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(2), pages 347-368, April.
    37. Goldin, Claudia & Libecap, Gary D. (ed.), 1994. "The Regulated Economy," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226301105, September.
    38. Timothy J. Hatton & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2005. "A Dual Policy Paradox: Why Have Trade and Immigration Policies Always Differed in Labor-Scarce Economies," NBER Working Papers 11866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    39. Bruce A., Blonigen, 2011. "Revisiting the evidence on trade policy preferences," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 129-135, September.
    40. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
    41. Hiscox, Michael J., 2002. "Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(3), pages 593-608, September.
    42. Wellisch, Dietmar & Walz, Uwe, 1998. "Why do rich countries prefer free trade over free migration? The role of the modern welfare state," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(8), pages 1595-1612, September.
    43. Hainmueller, Jens & Hiscox, Michael J., 2007. "Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 399-442, April.
    44. Iranzo, Susana & Peri, Giovanni, 2009. "Migration and trade: Theory with an application to the Eastern-Western European integration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 1-19, September.
    45. Jorge G. Gonzalez & Nipoli Kamdar, 2000. "Do Not Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor! Determinants of Legislator Voting on Immigration Issues," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 26(2), pages 127-143, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. The political economy of migration (the US)
      by UDADISI in UDADISI on 2013-01-14 07:53:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Bargain & Victor Stephane & Jérôme Valette, 2022. "Another brick in the wall. Immigration and electoral preferences: Direct evidence from state ballots," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(5), pages 1452-1477, November.
    2. Malcolm, Michael, 2017. "Do local exports impact congressional voting on free trade agreements?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 31-34.
    3. Anna Maria Mayda & Giovanni Peri & Walter Steingress, 2022. "The Political Impact of Immigration: Evidence from the United States," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 358-389, January.
    4. Facchini, Giovanni & Hatton, Timothy J. & Steinhardt, Max F., 2024. "Opening Heaven’s Door: Public Opinion and Congressional Votes on the 1965 Immigration Act," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 232-270, March.
    5. Arye L. Hillman & Ngo Long, 2022. "Immigrants as future voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 190(1), pages 149-174, January.
    6. Giovanni Facchini & Tommaso Frattini & Cora Signorotto, 2013. "Mind What Your Voters Read: Media Exposure and International Economic Policy Making," Development Working Papers 358, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    7. Peri, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Steingress, Walter, 2015. "Immigration to the U.S.: A problem for the Republicans or the Democrats?," CEPR Discussion Papers 11001, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Dreher, Axel & Langlotz, Sarah & Matzat, Johannes & Parsons, Christopher, 2020. "Immigration, Political Ideologies and the Polarization of American Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 15587, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Lake, James & Millimet, Daniel L., 2016. "An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 156-178.
    10. Karakas, Leyla D. & Kim, Nam Seok & Mitra, Devashish, 2021. "Attitudes towards globalization barriers and implications for voting: Evidence from Sweden," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 851-877.
    11. Casarico, Alessandra & Facchini, Giovanni & Frattini, Tommaso, 2018. "What drives the legalization of immigrants? Evidence from IRCA," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 258-273.
    12. Julian S. Leppin & Stefan Reitz, 2016. "The Role of a Changing Market Environment for Credit Default Swap Pricing," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(3), pages 209-223, July.
    13. Björn Brey, 2021. "The Effect of Recent Technological Change on US Immigration Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 9302, CESifo.
    14. Yi Che & Yi Lu & Justin R. Pierce & Peter K. Schott & Zhigang Tao, 2016. "Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?," NBER Working Papers 22178, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Ben G. Li & Yi Lu & Pasquale Sgro & Xing Xu, 2020. "Trump, China, and the Republicans," Discussion Papers 2020-26, University of Nottingham, GEP.
    16. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie, 2018. "Upward Income Mobility and Legislator Support for Education Policies," IZA Discussion Papers 11324, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Bräuninger, Michael, 2014. "Tax sovereignty and feasibility of international regulations for tobacco tax policies," HWWI Research Papers 152, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    18. Lake, James, 2015. "Revisiting the link between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 86-101.
    19. Che, Yi & Lu, Yi & Pierce, Justin R. & Schott, Peter K. & Tao, Zhigang, 2022. "Did trade liberalization with China influence US elections?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    20. repec:smu:ecowpa:1405 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Vöpel, Henning, 2013. "A Zidane clustering theorem: Why top players tend to play in one team and how the competitive balance can be restored," HWWI Research Papers 141, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Paola Conconi & Giovanni Facchini & Max F. Steinhardt & Maurizio Zanardi, 2020. "The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 250-278, July.
    2. Paola Conconi & Giovanni Facchini & Max F. Steinhardt & Maurizio Zanardi, 2012. "The Political Economy of Trade and Migration: Evidence from the US Congress: CEPR Discussion Paper 9270," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2012-49, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Giovanni Facchini & Tommaso Frattini & Cora Signorotto, 2013. "Mind What Your Voters Read: Media Exposure and International Economic Policy Making," Development Working Papers 358, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    4. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2011. "Do interest groups affect US immigration policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 114-128, September.
    5. Noel Gaston & Douglas R. Nelson, 2013. "Bridging Trade Theory And Labour Econometrics: The Effects Of International Migration," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 98-139, February.
    6. Giovanni Facchini & Anna Maria Mayda, 2009. "The Political Economy of Immigration Policy," Human Development Research Papers (2009 to present) HDRP-2009-03, Human Development Report Office (HDRO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), revised Apr 2009.
    7. Facchini, Giovanni & Steinhardt, Max Friedrich, 2011. "What drives U.S. immigration policy? Evidence from congressional roll call votes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 734-743, August.
    8. Milo Bianchi, 2013. "Immigration Policy and Self-Selecting Migrants," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(1), pages 1-23, February.
    9. Zanardi, Maurizio & Facchini, Giovanni & Conconi, Paola, 2011. "Policymakers? Horizon and Trade Reforms," CEPR Discussion Papers 8251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Conconi, Paola & Facchini, Giovanni & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2014. "Policymakers' horizon and trade reforms: The protectionist effect of elections," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 102-118.
    11. Giuseppe Russo, 2011. "Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 325-351, December.
    12. Gordon Hanson, 2010. "The Governance of Migration Policy," Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 185-207.
    13. Dan-Olof Rooth, 2007. "Implicit Discrimination in Hiring – Real World Evidence," RF Berlin - CReAM Discussion Paper Series 0705, Rockwool Foundation Berlin (RF Berlin) - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM).
    14. Facchini, Giovanni & Mayda, Anna Maria & Mishra, Prachi, 2007. "Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?," IZA Discussion Papers 3183, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Biavaschi, Costanza & Facchini, Giovanni, 2020. "Immigrant Franchise and Immigration Policy: Evidence from the Progressive Era," IZA Discussion Papers 13195, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    16. Anna Maria Mayda, 2006. "Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 510-530, August.
    17. Bougheas, Spiros & Nelson, Doug, 2013. "On the political economy of high skilled migration and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 206-224.
    18. Aquilante, Tommaso, 2018. "Undeflected pressure? The protectionist effect of political partisanship on US antidumping policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 455-470.
    19. Aquilante, Tommaso, 2015. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US," MPRA Paper 70359, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Timothy J. Hatton, 2010. "The Cliometrics Of International Migration: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(5), pages 941-969, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Roll-call votes; Trade reforms; Immigration reforms;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9270. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.