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Do Labor Market Imperfections Increase Trade Protection? A Theoretical Investigation

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  • Xenia Matschke

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

Labor market imperfections are commonly believed to be a major reason for imposing trade impediments. In this paper, I introduce labor market rigidities that are prevalent in continental European countries into the well-known protection for sale model proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). I show that contrary to commonly held views, imperfections in the labor market do not necessarily increase equilibrium trade protection. A testable equilibrium trade protection equation is also derived. The findings in this paper are hence particularly relevant for empirical tests of trade policy determinants in economies with more regulated labor markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Xenia Matschke, 2006. "Do Labor Market Imperfections Increase Trade Protection? A Theoretical Investigation," Working papers 2006-12, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2007.
    • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2006-12
    Note: I thank Scott Taylor for extensive discussions regarding this paper. His valuable comments and advice led to substantial improvements. Bob Baldwin, Bob Staiger, Achim Wambach and seminar participants at various universities provided helpful suggestions as well. Financial support from a Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft research fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kishore Gawande & Usree Bandyopadhyay, 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(1), pages 139-152, February.
    2. Matschke, Xenia N. & Sherlund, Shane M, 2003. "Do Labor Issues Matter In The Determination Of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0sn637k8, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    3. Baldwin, Robert E & Magee, Christopher S, 2000. "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 79-101, October.
    4. Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoğlu, 2016. "“Protection For Sale” In A Developing Country: Democracy Vs. Dictatorship," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 9, pages 163-174, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Lawrence F. Katz & Lawrence H. Summers, 1989. "Can Interindustry Wage Differentials Justify Strategic Trade Policy?," NBER Chapters, in: Trade Policies for International Competitiveness, pages 85-124, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Theo Eicher & Thomas Osang, 2002. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1702-1710, December.
    7. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    8. Phillip McCalman, 2004. "Protection for Sale and Trade Liberalization: an Empirical Investigation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 81-94, February.
    9. Xenia Matschke & Shane M. Sherlund, 2006. "Do Labor Issues Matter in the Determination of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 405-421, March.
    10. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    11. John K. Hill, 1984. "Union Wage Distortions and the Size and Efficiency of the Optimal Tariff," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 17(1), pages 146-155, February.
    12. Rama, Martin & Tabellim, Guido, 1998. "Lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1295-1316, July.
    13. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494, Elsevier.
    14. Kiminori Matsuyama, 1990. "Export Subsidies as an Outcome of the Management-Labor Conspiracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(3), pages 803-813.
    15. Avinash Dixit, 1996. "Special-Interest Lobbying and Endogenous Commodity Taxation," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 375-388, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yoto V. Yotov, 2010. "Trade‐Induced Unemployment: How Much Do We Care?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(5), pages 972-989, November.
    2. Christopher Laincz & Xenia Matschke & Yoto V. Yotov, 2021. "Policy and politics: Trade adjustment assistance in the crossfire," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 760-792, May.
    3. Michele Santoni, 2017. "Protective Excise Taxation," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 421-445, December.
    4. repec:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:3:p:1867-1885 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Jochen Michaelis & Marco de Pinto, 2014. "The labor market effects of trade unions - Layard meets Melitz," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201406, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    6. Wisarut Suwanprasert, 2020. "Optimal trade policy, equilibrium unemployment, and labor market inefficiency," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 1232-1268, November.
    7. Barbosa, Natália & Faria, Ana Paula, 2011. "Innovation across Europe: How important are institutional differences?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1157-1169.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tariffs; trade protection; protection for sale; labor market.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F16 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Labor Market Interactions

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