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Reconciling observed tariffs and the median voter model

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  • Dhingra, Swati

Abstract

Median voter theory applied to trade policy predicts positive tariffs in capital-abundant countries and negative tariffs in labor-abundant countries. Negative tariffs are rare, and this paper reconciles the median voter theory with observed protectionism across countries. By considering large countries, I show the optimal tariff is a sum of the median voter component and a positive term of trade component. Positive terms of trade effects raise tariffs in all countries, and can overcome the negative median voter component in labor-abundant countries. Testing the tariff prediction with cross-section and panel data from the 1990s, I show the median voter component is negative in labor-abundant countries and positive in capital-abundant countries. As expected, terms of trade effects raise tariffs across all countries and are stronger among nonmembers of the WTO.

Suggested Citation

  • Dhingra, Swati, 2014. "Reconciling observed tariffs and the median voter model," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 59227, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:59227
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    File URL: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/59227/
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    Cited by:

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    2. Egger, Hartmut & Fischer, Christian, 2020. "Increasing resistance to globalization: The role of trade in tasks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
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    4. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "The Design of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 22087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Kyle Bagwell & Chad P. Bown & Robert W. Staiger, 2016. "Is the WTO Passé?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1125-1231, December.

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    JEL classification:

    • J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics

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