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Congressional voting on DR-CAFTA: the ineffectiveness of environmental lobbying


  • Pauline Abetti


This paper examines the determinants of Congressional voting on CAFTA, focusing on environmental lobbying. Empirical results indicate that the environment was in fact not a major point of contention during the CAFTA vote. Campaign contributions were, however, an important factor in determining the vote. Indeed, with no contributions from labor or business, the CAFTA would not have passed. Employment in the sensitive sectors of CAFTA, sugar and textiles, were also critical in affecting the vote. An unanticipated result in this analysis was the effect of income on the CAFTA vote - poorer districts favored the agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Pauline Abetti, 2008. "Congressional voting on DR-CAFTA: the ineffectiveness of environmental lobbying," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 11-20.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jecprf:v:11:y:2008:i:1:p:11-20 DOI: 10.1080/17487870802031437

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    Cited by:

    1. John Gilbert & Reza Oladi, 2012. "Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 745-769, March.
    2. B. Chupp, 2014. "Political interaction in the senate: estimating a political “spatial” weights matrix and an application to lobbying behavior," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(3), pages 521-538, September.
    3. Allen, Linda J., 2014. "Trade and Environment: A new Direction for Green Trade," Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade, vol. 15(1).
    4. J. Brian O’Roark, 2012. "Economists in Congress: How Economic Education Motivates Votes on Free Trade in Congress," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 27(Spring 20), pages 83-101.


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