Sparation of Powers and Accountability : Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics
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Other versions of this item:
- Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Separation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1475, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of powers and accountability: Towards a formal approach to comparative politics," Seminar Papers 612, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Omar Azfar & William Nelson, 2007. "Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 471-493, March.
- Wihlborg, Clas, 2005. "Solving the bargaining democracy problem using a constitutional hierarchy for law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 655-673, April.
- Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred Neumann, 2000.
"A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence,"
Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 136(2), pages 315-333, June.
- Herrendorf, B. & Neumann, M.J.M., 1998. "A non-Normative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 515, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Herrendorf, Berthold & Neumann, Manfred J. M., 1998. "A Non-normative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence," Economic Research Papers 268797, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1999. "Political economy, information and incentives1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 649-669, April.
- Brown, David S. & Touchton, Michael & Whitford, Andrew, 2011. "Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1516-1529, September.
- Kausik Chaudhuri & Sugato Dasgupta, 2005. "The political determinants of central governments' economic policies in India: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(7), pages 957-978.
- Jess Benhabib & Adam Przeworski, 2010. "Economic growth under political accountability," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 77-95, March.
- Shann Turnbull, 2007. "Analysing Network Governance of Public Assets," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1079-1089, November.
- Piketty, Thomas, 1999. "The information-aggregation approach to political institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 791-800, April.
- Mark Latham, 2003. "Democracy and Infomediaries," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 91-101, April.
- Michael Mitsopoulos & Theodore Pelagidis, 2017. "A model of constitutional design and corruption," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 67-90, August.
- Shann Turnbull, 2017. "Grounding a Theory of Firms in the Natural Sciences," Humanistic Management Journal, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 159-186, April.
More about this item
Keywords
VOTING ; LEGISLATIVE POWER ; GOVERNMENT;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
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