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Sparation of Powers and Accountability : Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics

Author

Listed:
  • Persson, T
  • Roland, G
  • Tabellini, G

Abstract

A political constitution is like an incomplete contract : it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem : the appointed policy maker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests of the citizens. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials. But elections are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps the voters, in two distincts ways.

Suggested Citation

  • Persson, T & Roland, G & Tabellini, G, 1996. "Sparation of Powers and Accountability : Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics," Papers 612, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:612
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    Cited by:

    1. Brown, David S. & Touchton, Michael & Whitford, Andrew, 2011. "Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1516-1529, September.
    2. Omar Azfar & William Nelson, 2007. "Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 471-493, March.
    3. Wihlborg, Clas, 2005. "Solving the bargaining democracy problem using a constitutional hierarchy for law," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 655-673, April.
    4. Piketty, Thomas, 1999. "The information-aggregation approach to political institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 791-800, April.
    5. Kausik Chaudhuri & Sugato Dasgupta, 2005. "The political determinants of central governments' economic policies in India: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(7), pages 957-978.
    6. repec:kap:ejlwec:v:44:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10657-015-9486-z is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred Neumann, 2000. "A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 136(2), pages 315-333, June.
    8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1999. "Political economy, information and incentives1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 649-669, April.
    9. Shann Turnbull, 2007. "Analysing Network Governance of Public Assets," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(6), pages 1079-1089, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    VOTING ; LEGISLATIVE POWER ; GOVERNMENT;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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