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Political Influence in a New Anti-Dumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico

  • Francois, Joseph
  • Niels, Gunnar

We examine the role of political factors in Mexico’s anti-dumping regime, considering both the characteristics of target countries subject to anti-dumping duties and industry-specific factors for sectors receiving protection. Our results are broadly consistent with the recent theoretical literature on endogenous protection, in terms of both the political costs and the political benefits of providing protection. They are also in line with the existing empirical literature on anti-dumping, which is focused primarily on the experience of the US and the EU. Our results also suggest that WTO Membership of trading partners increases the political costs of supplying administered protection.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4297.

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Date of creation: Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4297
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  1. Maurizio Zanardi, 2002. "Antidumping: What are the Numbers?," Working Papers 2002_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
  3. Andreas Waldkirch, 2003. "The 'new regionalism' and foreign direct investment: the case of Mexico," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 151-184.
  4. kishore gawande & pravin krishna, 2005. "The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Empirical Approaches," International Trade 0503003, EconWPA.
  5. Bruce A. Blonigen & Chad P. Bown, 2001. "Antidumping and Retaliation Threats," NBER Working Papers 8576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Czinkota, Michael R. & Kotabe, Masaaki, 1997. "A marketing perspective of the U.S. International Trade Commission's antidumping actions--an empirical inquiry," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 169-187, July.
  7. Joseph Francois & Gunnar Niels, 2003. "Business Cycles, the Current Account, and Administered Protection in Mexico," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-054/2, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. Thomas Prusa & Susan Skeath, 2002. "The economic and strategic motives for antidumping filings," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 389-413, September.
  9. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
  10. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December.
  11. Finger, J M & Hall, H Keith & Nelson, Douglas R, 1982. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 452-66, June.
  12. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
  13. Robert E. Baldwin & Jeffrey W. Steagall, 1993. "An Analysis of Factors Influencing ITC Decisions in Antidumoing, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases," NBER Working Papers 4282, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Tharakan, P. K. M. & Waelbroeck, J., 1994. "Antidumping and countervailing duty decisions in the E.C. and in the U.S.: An experiment in comparative political economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 171-193, January.
  15. repec:dgr:uvatin:2003054 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
  17. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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