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How Do Countries Respond to Antidumping Filings? Dispute Settlement and Retaliatory Antidumping

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  • Robert M. Feinberg
  • Kara M. Reynolds

Abstract

Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the antidumping petitions filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory antidumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic response—filing a complaint under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding. Using a panel of global antidumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyze under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an antidumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed a retaliatory antidumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2017. "How Do Countries Respond to Antidumping Filings? Dispute Settlement and Retaliatory Antidumping," Working Papers 2017-08, American University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:amu:wpaper:2017-08
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Anti-dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 403-433, March.
    2. Blonigen, Bruce A. & Bown, Chad P., 2003. "Antidumping and retaliation threats," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 249-273, August.
    3. Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "On the spread and impact of anti-dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 591-611, August.
    4. Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, 2005. "Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 557-598, June.
    5. Thomas Prusa & Susan Skeath, 2002. "The economic and strategic motives for antidumping filings," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 138(3), pages 389-413, September.
    6. Chad Bown & Kara Reynolds, 2015. "Trade flows and trade disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 145-177, June.
    7. Knetter, Michael M. & Prusa, Thomas J., 2003. "Macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings: evidence from four countries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-17, October.
    8. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006. "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 877-890, April.
    9. Francois, Joseph & Niels, Gunnar, 2004. "Political Influence in a New Anti-Dumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico," CEPR Discussion Papers 4297, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Johns, Leslie & Pelc, Krzysztof J., 2014. "Who Gets to Be In the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(03), pages 663-699, June.
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    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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