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Partisanship and Antidumping

  • Veysel Avsar

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Florida International University)

This paper empirically examines the influence of political partisanship on antidumping protection, which has become the most frequently used contingent trade remedy in the last 20 years. First, we show that the number of antidumping initiations from the labor intensive industries increases when there is a left-wing government in power. In addition, the evidence on the governments¡¯ decision to impose antidumping duty demonstrates that the increase in the leftist orientation of the governments is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an affirmative antidumping outcome from the petitions of labor intensive industries. Although antidumping is an administrative protection which includes a set of necessary procedures and rules to follow, our findings clearly points out the political bias in AD actions in the form of partisan preferences.

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Paper provided by Florida International University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1006.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fiu:wpaper:1006
Contact details of provider: Postal: Miami, FL 33199
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Web page: http://economics.fiu.edu

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  1. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Maurizio Zanardi, 2002. "Antidumping: What are the Numbers?," Working Papers 2002_15, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  3. Thomas J. Prusa & Susan Skeath, 2001. "The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Filings," NBER Working Papers 8424, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Michael Moore & Maurizio Zanardi, 2008. "Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?," Working Papers ECARES 2008_024, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  5. Epstein, David & O'Halloran, Sharyn, 1996. "The partisan paradox and the U.S. tariff, 1877–1934," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(02), pages 301-324, March.
  6. Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2002. "Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 9239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Olson, 2004. "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," International Trade 0411003, EconWPA.
  8. Pablo M. Pinto & Santiago M. Pinto, 2008. "The Politics Of Investment Partisanship: And The Sectoral Allocation Of Foreign Direct Investment," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 216-254, 06.
  9. Thomas Prusa & Michael Knetter, 2000. "Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Filings: Evidence from Four Countries," Departmental Working Papers 200023, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  10. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
  11. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Anti-dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 403-433, 03.
  12. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
  13. Blonigen, Bruce A., 2006. "Working the system: Firm learning and the antidumping process," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 715-731, September.
  14. Bruce A. Blonigen & Chad P. Bown, 2001. "Antidumping and Retaliation Threats," NBER Working Papers 8576, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Heckman, James J, 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 153-61, January.
  16. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  17. Kara M. Olson, 2004. "Subsidizing Rent-Seeking: Antidumping Protection and the Byrd Amendment," International Trade 0407005, EconWPA.
  18. Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "On the spread and impact of anti-dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 34(3), pages 591-611, August.
  19. Robert M. Feinberg, 2005. "U.S. Antidumping Enforcement and Macroeconomic Indicators Revisited: Do Petitioners Learn?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 141(4), pages 612-622, December.
  20. Chad P. Bown, 2008. "The Wto And Antidumping In Developing Countries," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 255-288, 06.
  21. Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Global antidumping database version 1.0," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3737, The World Bank.
  22. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2007. "Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(6), pages 948-961, 06.
  23. Bown, Chad P., 2006. "The World Trade Organization and antidumping in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4014, The World Bank.
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