WTO Tariff Commitments and Temporary Protection: Complements or Substitutes?
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More about this item
KeywordsGATT/WTO; Temporary Protection; Tariff Overhang;
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
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